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THE BALDWIN PRINCIPLE
Ryan Patrick Phair*

I. INTRODUCTION

Consider the following scenario. A law student slips and
falls in a dark hallway after hours. He brings a tort action against
the law school alleging that it was negligent because (1) it failed
to provide adequate lighting in the hallways at night and (2) it
failed to provide sufficient notice that the floors had just been
waxed. The judge instructs the jury to return a general verdict.
After deliberating, the jury finds the law school liable. The law
school feels wronged and appeals the case. On appeal, the circuit
court finds that there was insufficient evidence to find the law
school liable on the second theory of liability. Indeed, a sign had
been posted in the hallway to the effect that the floors had just
been waxed, but the law student was too tired and dazed to
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notice. The law school argues that the general verdict must be
vacated and the case remanded to the trial court for a new trial
because, they argue, there is no way to know if the jury based its
general verdict on the improper theory of liability. In response,
the law student argues that the focus of the entire case had been
on the failure to provide lighting. It was emphasized at closing
argument, and almost all of the evidence related to this point. He
thus urges the circuit court to exercise its discretion and find that
the error was harmless. How should the circuit court dispose of
this case?
In the early part of this century, the Supreme Court
developed a general principle-the Baldwin' principle-that
mandated the result urged by the law school. Essentially, the
court vacated the verdict and granted a new trial due to the
ambiguity in the jury's verdict. However, in the 1970s and
1980s, the federal circuit courts began to move towards the law
student's position by distinguishing the Baldwin principle in
myriad ways. In response, however, a handful of dissenting
judges sharply criticized the movement away from the Baldwin
principle as a direct contravention of binding United States
Supreme Court authority. The appellate court in the law school
case is therefore faced with a difficult situation. Should it adhere
to possibly outdated Supreme Court precedent? Or should it
embrace the modem analysis and its controversial methods of
distinguishing the Court's early precedents? What happens if the
federal rule, whatever it may be, conflicts with the rule of the
state where the law student brought suit? This article endeavors
to answer those questions.
Part II describes the genesis of the Baldwin principle and
the early Supreme Court precedents that nurtured it. It also
examines the circuit courts' initial endorsement of the Baldwin
principle. Part III moves on to the modem era. It traces the
development of discretionary rules, such as the Ninth Circuit's
Traver rule and the harmless error exception embraced in other
circuits, from the 1970s and 1980s to the present day, and notes
the circuit courts' increased receptiveness to discretionary
arguments in the past six years. Part III also delineates the

1. See Maryland v. Baldwin, 112 U.S. 490 (1884).
2. See Traver v. Meshriy, 627 F.2d 934 (9th Cir. 1980).
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arguments advanced by the circuit courts to rationalize their
departure from the Baldwin principle, as well as the objections
of those old-fashioned judges who refused to ride the wave.
Next, in Part IV, a detailed analysis is presented of the various
arguments made by the modem circuit courts. After rebutting
each of the arguments advanced, Part IV concludes that,
contrary to the picture painted by the modem circuit courts, the
Baldwin principle is alive and well. Finally, in Part V, a policybased defense of the Baldwin principle is presented. After
examining the requirement of a unanimous jury verdict in
federal civil cases, Part V asserts that the appellate courts
advocating harmless error analysis greatly overestimate their
ability to ascertain when an error is in fact harmless. In addition,
because a harmless error rule presents a severe danger of
abrogating the unanimity requirement ex post, Part V maintains
that it can not be justified when there are less blunt methods,
such as a waiver rule, that achieve the same result at less
potential cost.
II. AN OVERVIEW

OF THE BALDWIN PRINCIPLE IN THE EARLY

YEARS

A. The Development of the Baldwin Principlein the Supreme
Court
While there has been a long debate over the proper
appellate disposition of multi-faceted general verdicts where an
error is found to lie in one facet, the issue has become highly
controversial in recent years. Yet, up until the mid-1970s, the
Supreme Court had enunciated and adhered to a general
principle that required the appellate court to vacate the verdict
and remand the case to the district court for a new trial. In
response, the federal circuit courts respected the Court's
decision and routinely applied the general principle to vacate
and remand such cases.
The genesis of the principle can be traced all the way back
to a Supreme Court case decided by Justice Field in 1884. In
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Maryland v. Baldwin,3 a young man named Markley sued the
administrator of what he alleged to be his father's estate for the
one-fourth inheritance to which he claimed to be entitled under
law. As part of their defense, the defendants-the administrators
of the deceased's estate-asserted claims that included the
following: (1) Markley was not one of the heirs of the deceased
because his mother was not married to the deceased; and (2)
they had executed a $3,500 accord with Markley. At trial,
Markley asserted that his mother was married to the deceased,
even though he could not produce a marriage certificate or a
witness who attended the wedding. The star witness was a good
friend of the deceased named Cross. Cross testified that the
deceased had admitted to him that he was legally married to
Markley's mother and explained his reasons for concealing the
marriage. The defendants objected to this testimony as hearsay.
The trial court overruled the objection, but permitted one of the
defendants to testify as to conversations he had with the
deceased about Cross's dishonesty.
At the close of evidence, the trial court submitted the case
to the jury on a general verdict,4 and the jury found in favor of
the defendants. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that it was
error to admit the defendant's testimony about what the
deceased had told him about Cross as it was mere hearsay The
question then was the proper disposition of the case. The Court
noted that there was evidence introduced at trial bearing on all of
the issues that the defendants asserted, and that "if any one of
the pleas was, in the opinion of the jury, sustained, their verdict
was properly rendered." 6 Yet, the Court went on to formulate
what has become known as the Baldwin principle:
[The] generality [of the verdict] prevents us from
perceiving upon which [issue] [the jury] found. If,
therefore, upon any one issue error was committed, either
in the admission of evidence, or in the charge of the court,
the verdict cannot be upheld, for it may be that by that

3. 112 U.S. 490(1884).
4. A general verdict is one in which the jury finds for one or the other party, without

making a specific finding of fact, such as on which theory of liability it is basing its verdict.
5. Baldwin, 112 U.S. at 494 ("This testimony was clearly inadmissible; it was mere

hearsay.").
6. Id. at 493.
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evidence the jury were controlled under the instructions
given.7

As a result of this principle, the Court vacated the general
verdict and ordered a new trial for Markley.8
The Baldwin decision arose in the context of a single theory
of liability to which there were multiple defenses, one of which
was in error. It thus applied when a plaintiff sought to attack on
appeal a general verdict for the defendant.
The courts soon extended the logic of the Baldwin principle
to the realm of multiple theories of liability. In the 1907 case of
Wilmington Star Mining Co. v. Fulton,9 Samuel Fulton, a

trackman and mine laborer in a mine operated by the
Wilmington Star Mining Company, was killed by an explosion
of mine gas. Fulton's widow subsequently brought a wrongful
death claim against Wilmington and alleged eight specific
theories of negligence. The Court, however, found there to be
insufficient evidence to support one of the theories, and since "it
[was] impossible ... to say upon which of the counts ... the

[general] verdict was based," the judgment was vacated.'0 The
conclusion, the Court believed, flowed naturally from the
Baldwin decision."

Forty years later, in the 1959 case of United New York &
New Jersey Sandy Hook Pilots Association v. Halecki, 2 the

7. Id.
8. Id. at 495.
9. 205 U.S. 60 (1907).
10. Id. at 79. ("[W]here a jury is wrongfully permitted, over the objection of the
opposing party, to take into consideration in reaching a verdict counts of a declaration
which have not been supported by any evidence, and where it is impossible from the record
to say upon which of the counts of the declaration the verdict was based, [it cannot be said]
that the judgment entered under such circumstances can be sustained upon the theory that
substantial rights of the objecting party had not been invaded.").
11. Id. at 78 (citing Baldwin and noting that "[u]nder this [scenario] we find it
impossible to say that prejudicial error did not result"). It should be noted, however, that
the Wilmington decision foreshadowed later developments in this area. First, it noted that
the rule is different in the criminal context. Id. (" And, of course, in a case like the one we
are considering we cannot maintain the verdict, as might be done in a criminal case upon a
general verdict of guilty upon all the counts of an indictment."). Second, it specifically
distinguished the applicability of Illinois's "two issue" rule. Id. at 78-79. Note: In a
nutshell, the two-issue rule is simply that if a general verdict is rendered upon multiple
theories of liability (issues), and at least one of those theories is supported by sufficient
evidence, the general verdict will be allowed to stand.
12. 358 U.S. 613 (1959).
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Court once again affirmed the applicability of the Baldwin
principle in this context. An electrician named Halecki died of
carbon tetrachloride fume inhalation after spraying the pilot boat
New Jersey with the chemical as part of a generator repair job
that the ship's owners had sub-contracted to Halecki's employer.
The administratrix of Halecki's estate brought a wrongful death
action, and the court issued jury instructions that allowed
Halecki' s estate to recover on two separate theories of liabilitynegligence or the unseaworthiness doctrine. The jury returned a
general verdict in favor of Halecki's estate.' 3 On appeal, the
Supreme Court held that it was error to submit the case to the
jury on the unseaworthiness claim because Halecki was not a
member of the ship's crew, and so the ship did not owe him a
special duty.' 4 The negligence claim, however, was proper."
Echoing (but not citing) the language of Baldwin, the Court then
ordered a new trial because there was "no way to know that the
invalid claim of unseaworthiness was not the sole basis for the
verdict." 6 Three years later, in Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Winckler
& Smith Citrus Products Co.,' 7 the Court yet again affirmed the
rationale of the Baldwin principle in an antitrust case in which
the court submitted multiple theories of liability to the jury and a
general verdict was returned."
The Supreme Court was thus quite clear that the Baldwin
principle forced a federal appellate court to vacate a general
verdict based on multiple defenses, as in Baldwin, or multiple
theories of liability, as in Halecki and Sunkist Growers,
wherever one of the defenses or theories, respectively, was in
error as a matter of law. 9 The proper disposition then was to
vacate the judgment, remand the case, and order a new trial. It
was simply improper for an appellate body to attempt to divine
the defense or theory upon which the jury had based its decision.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id at 614.
Id. at617-618.
Id. at 618.
Id.
370 U.S. 19 (1962).

18. Id. at 29-30. ("Since we hold erroneous one theory of liability upon which the
general verdict may have rested [... ] it is unnecessary for us to explore the legality of the
other theories.") (citing Baldwin).

19. It is important to note that a wide range of errors is possible, ranging from
evidentiary problems to insufficient evidence to bad law.
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B. The Baldwin Principle in the Lower Courts
The Court had spoken and, for the most part, the federal

bench listened. Early cases in the federal appellate courts
steadfastly adhered to the Baldwin principle. The Eighth Circuit,
in particular, promulgated a number of decisions between 1893

and 1903 that seemed to entrench the Baldwin principle deeply
in the case law. 0 Surprisingly, the Eighth Circuit did not publish
another opinion referring to the Baldwin principle until 1978.
Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit picked up the slack in the first
half of the century,2' and with the Eighth and Fifth Circuits'

bodies of precedent firmly established, the First,"

Third 23

20. See e.g Patton v. Wells, 121 F. 337, 340 (8th Cir. 1903); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co.
v. McGreevy, 118 F. 415, 419 (8th Cir. 1902) (citing Baldwin); Durant Min. Co. v. Percy
Consol. Min. Co., 93 F. 166, 169-70 (8th Cir. 1899); Lyon, Potter & Co. v. FirstNat. Bank
of Sioux City, Iowa, 85 F. 120, 125 (8th Cir. 1898); Cresswell Ranch & Cattle Co. v.
Martindale, 63 F. 84, 90 (8th Cir. 1894) (citing Baldwin); St. Louis, LM. & S. Ry. Co. v.
Needham, 63 F. 107, 114 (8th Cir. 1894) (citing Baldwin); What Cheer Coal Co. v.
Johnson, 56 F. 810, 813 (8th Cir. 1893) (citing Baldwin).
21. See Lyle v. Bentley, 406 F.2d 325, 327-28 (5th Cir. 1969) (" If the jury's verdict was
in fact based on [a proper claim of] undue influence, which it could have been, and if the
evidence to sustain such a finding was insufficient, then the verdict must not be allowed to
stand. Under such circumstances it matters not how much evidence there is in the record of
[the valid] mental incapacity [claim]. Since the general verdict speaks affirmatively with
respect to either or both of the issues submitted to the jury, we have no way of knowing
upon what basis the jury's verdict was founded. Therefore, while the subjectives of the
jury's deliberations are not for us to examine, if those deliberations as directed by the
court's instructions permit a verdict to be based on an issue not supported by sufficient
evidence, the jury verdict must be set aside and a new trial held."); E.L Cheeney Co. v.
Gates, 346 F.2d 197, 200 & n. 4 (5th Cir. 1965); Vandercook & Son, Inc. v. Thorpe, 344
F.2d 930 (5th Cir. 1965) (same); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Wilkes, 76 F.2d 701 (5th Cir. 1935)
(same); Am. Sugar Refining Co. v. J.E. Jones & Co., 293 F. 560, 562-63 (5th Cir. 1923)
(same) (Hugo Black arguing for defendants in error). See also Mixon v. A. Coast Line R.R.
Co., 370 F.2d 852, 860-62 (5th Cir. 1966) (Brown, J., concurring) (concurring to
emphasize the "woeful and unfortunate loss of precious judicial time" resulting from the
trial court's failure to use a specialized verdict). Chief Judge Brown later felt so strongly
about the issue that he wrote a tract on it. See John R. Brown, Federal Special Verdicts:
The Doubt Eliminator,44 F.R.D. 245, 338 (1968).
22. See N.Y. & Porto Rico S.S. Co. v. Garcia, 16 F.2d 734, 737 (1st Cir. 1926) ("To
add to the difficulties, the jury returned a general verdict, and, such being the case, it
cannot be said whether the verdict was based upon the action of contract or the action for
slander.") (citing Baldwin).
23. See Albergo v. Reading Co., 372 F.2d 83, 85-86 (3rd Cir. 1966) (In a Wilmington
scenario, "since the evidence was insufficient to warrant submission of the first [FELA]
claim to the jury, the judgment of the court below would be sustainable only if the verdict
rested solely on the second [separate FELA] claim. The form of the verdict makes it
impossible for us to determine whether it rested on the first claim, the second, or both.
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Fourth,24 Tenth, 5 and D.C.26 Circuits each followed suit, often

citing both to Baldwin and either the Fifth or Eighth Circuit's
decisions.
Some courts extended the Baldwin principle further, to a
point beyond the specific constraints of the Supreme Court's
decisions. For example, in Laguna Royalty Co. v. Marsh,27 the
Fifth Circuit extended the logic of the Baldwin principle to a
judgment in which a specific interrogatory was so open-ended
that it was the functional equivalent of a general verdict: "The
jury's answer [to the interrogatory] is, for all practical purposes,
obscured in the impenetrable mystery of a general verdict ...
That the mystery is less perhaps than had there been nothing but
a general charge and verdict is beside the point."2 Moreover, in
29 the First
New York & Porto Rico Steamship Co. v. Garcia,

Circuit found that the Baldwin principle applied to a judgment in
which a jury returned a general verdict that encompassed two
separate causes of action, although it held that the very
submission of a general verdict on two separate causes of action
is error in and of itself.3 °
Where, as here, a general verdict may rest on either of two claims--one supported by the
evidence and the other not-a judgment thereon must be reversed."). After the Third
Circuit ordered a new trial, it pointed out that it would not have been necessary had the trial
court employed either a specialized verdict or a general verdict accompanied by answers to
specific interrogatories, both of which Rule 49 was designed to encourage. Id. at 86.
24. See A. Coast Line R. Co. v. Tiller, 142 F.2d 718, 722 (4th Cir. 1944) ("[S]ince the
verdict was general, it is impossible to say whether it was based upon the [general
negligence] issue that was properly submitted to the jury or upon the [special negligence
arising out of the alleged violation of the Federal Boilers Inspection Act] issue that should
have been withdrawn.") (citing Baldwin and Wilmington).
25. See Murphy v. Dyer, 409 F.2d 747, 748 (10th Cir. 1969) (citing Baldwin and
Sunkist Growers).
26. See N. Am. Graphite Corp. v. Allan, 184 F.2d 387, 389 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
27. 350 F.2d 817 (5th Cir. 1965).
28. Id. at 823-24. See also Prudential Ins. Co. v. Morrow, 339 F.2d 411, 412-13 (5th
Cir. 1964) (same).
29. 16 F.2d at 736-37.
30. In this case, Dolores Carmoega Garcia alleged that a steamship's refusal to
transport her to New York constituted a breach of contract and that the steamship's
pretextual justification, stated openly and in public, that she suffered from a contagious
venereal disease constituted slander. The jury returned a general verdict for Garcia and
assessed damages in the sum of $4,900, costs, and attorney's fees. On appeal, the First
Circuit vacated the judgment. As a preliminary matter, the First Circuit noted that the
"causes of action set out in the complaint are distinct and independent, and should not have
been joined. They cannot be regarded as counts in a declaration, each stating the same
cause of action, but with slight modifications, for they are not such." Id. at 736-37. In
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In the early years, then, the Baldwin principle became
firmly established in the case law and the courts extended its
underlying logic to scenarios outside of the Court's precedent.
But that is not to say that there were no rogues or dissenters.
Indeed there were. Perhaps the most notorious of all these courts
was the Seventh Circuit, although the Second and Sixth Circuits
were to a lesser extent complicit in this endeavor. The point of
departure for these circuits was the question of whether federal
or state law governed the scenarios covered by the Baldwin
principle.
In Firemen'sInsurance Co. v. Follett," the Seventh Circuit
addressed the Wilmington variation 32 of the Baldwin principle
and found state law to govern. The court noted that the Illinois
"two issue" rule, as developed by an Illinois statute and a long
line of state case law dating back to 1845, was that "where there
are several counts in the declaration, if there is one good count
sustained by the evidence, where a general verdict is returned by
the jury, the verdict will not be set aside by reason of the
unsustained counts being permitted to go to the jury."3 3 This
rule, of course, runs counter to the Baldwin principle. It
essentially assumes that a jury's general verdict was based on a
sufficient theory of liability, even though there was insufficient
evidence to support at least one of the other theories of liability.
Why, however, did Wilmington not cover this case? In
Wilmington, the Court had suggested that the Illinois rule was
not premised on the inability of the appellate court to ascertain
the basis for the jury's decision, but rather on a waiver principle.
The Court noted that the Illinois courts had construed the rule so
as to apply only to situations in which the appellant had not
objected to the return of a general verdict on multiple theories of

effect, the First Circuit held that it was error to even allow the jury to return a general
verdict when there are multiple causes of action (as opposed to multiple theories of
liability). Nevertheless, even putting this aside, the court held that, assuming there was an
error in one theory of liability (as there was with respect to the slander cause of action), it
could not have been corrected: "To add to the difficulties, the jury returned a general
verdict, and, such being the case, it cannot be said whether the verdict was based upon the
action of contract or the action for slander." Id. at 737 (citing Baldwin).
31. 72 F.2d 49 (1934).
32. That is, the scenario where there is insufficient evidence to sustain one of several
theories of liability and a general verdict is returned.
33. Firemen's Ins. Co., 72 F.2d at 51 (collecting case law and summarizing decisions).

98
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liability," and in Wilmington, the appellant had done so.35 In
contrast, in Firemen'sInsurance, the Seventh Circuit found that
the appellant had not objected and distinguished Wilmington on
this basis.36 The Firemen's Insurance decision thus exposed the
Supreme Court's willingness to be somewhat receptive to the
idea that a state rule could trump the Baldwin principle, and
upon this basis, several courts began to explore the idea.
Although the Firemen's Insurance decision seems to have
plausibly distinguished the Wilmington case, the Seventh Circuit
dispensed with the niceties seven years later. In Cross v. Ryan,37
the Seventh Circuit found the "two issue" rule to be operative
without referencing the Wilmington or Firemen's Insurance
decisions, Illinois law, or whether the appellant had objected
prior to the close of evidence. 8 Because there was sufficient
evidence supporting each theory of liability, however, the
disposition of the case was not affected by this decision (or at
least not in any manifest way). No harm, no foul? Perhaps. Of
course, in the Cross decision itself, the failure to recognize the
distinction of Wilmington offered in Firemen's Insurance was
troublesome, 9 but a greater harm could have arisen by virtue of
34. Wilmington, 205 U.S. at 79 (" [A] party cannot wait until after the close of the
evidence at the trial, and a fortiori, after verdict, and then for the first time question the
sufficiency of the counts.") (citing Chicago v. Lonergan, 63 N.E. 1018 (Ill. 1902) and
Consol. Coal Co. v. Scheiber, 47 N.E. 1052 (I11.1897)).
35. Id. at 78-79 ("Nor does § 57 of the Illinois practice act... support the contention
that errors of the character of those we have just been considering must be treated as not
prejudicial" because the jury was permitted to return a general verdict "over the objection
of the opposing party").
36. 72 F.2d at 51-52 ("No such motion was made in the present case.
So there
really was a different question in the Wilmington case from the one here presented .... The
Supreme Court of the United States, in the Wilmington case, was not attempting to lay
down a new rule to supersede the well-established rule in Illinois ... but it held that in that
case the failure of the court to allow a defendant's motion before verdict to strike from the
record certain counts, to establish which no proof had been offered, was prejudicial error.
Had a similar motion been made in this case ... and no evidence offered to sustain it, and
an adverse ruling upon the motion, then a [different] situation would have been
presented.").
37. 124 F.2d 883 (1941).
38. Id. at 887 ("We have held each count good, and therefore if there is substantial
evidence to sustain any one count in favor of each plaintiff, the general verdict must be
upheld.").
39. It is arguably less troublesome than one might initially think considering that the
Supreme Court denied certiorari in the case. See Ryan v. Cross, 316 U.S. 682 (1942). Of
course, the refusal of the Supreme Court to grant certiorari does not necessarily mean that it
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the distinction being lost in the case law. Fortunately, in the
early years, it did not.
Instead, the more technically correct analysis in the
Firemen'sInsurance decision began to seep into the case law of
the other circuits, most notably the Second Circuit. In the early
years, the Second Circuit had adhered to the Baldwin principle.40
However, from the mid-1940s until the 1960s, the Second
Circuit began to come under the influence of the Seventh
Circuit's analysis, often citing its decisions to support the
application of a "two issue" rule. In Lee v. Pennsylvania
Railroad Co.,4 1 the Second Circuit appeared to adopt Firemen's
Insurance's distinguishing of Wilmington:
A general verdict is upheld where there is substantial
evidence supporting any ground of recovery in favor of an
appellee. The situation is otherwise where timely objection
has been made to the submission of a ground inadequately
supported along with one duly supported by the evidence.
But to preserve such a contention for the consideration of
the appellate tribunal, the matter must be specifically called
to the attention of the trial judge in order that he may have
the opportunity to consider the asserted insufficiency as to
one [theory of liability] and correct himself, if necessary,
by removing it from the jury's consideration. 42
Oddly enough, the Second Circuit cited the Cross decision
for this proposition; it made no mention of Firemen's Ins. Co.
itself.43 Regardless, the "two issue" rule in the Second Circuit
was short-lived. In the 1960 decision of Fatovic v. Holland
America Line,an the Second Circuit, with little discussion,

approved of the Cross decision. Indeed, it is wise not to read too much into denials of
certiorari.
40. See Rashaw v. C. Vt. Ry., Inc., 133 F.2d 253, 256 (2d Cir. 1943); Christian v.
Boston & M.R.R., 109 F.2d 103, 105 (2d Cir. 1940) (citing Wilmington).
41. 192 F.2d 226 (2d Cir. 1951). This case contains the most thorough analysis of the
issue. For other Second Circuit cases during this era invoking the distinction, see Ortiz v.
Grace Line, Inc., 250 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1957) and Vareltzis v. Luckenbach Steamship Co.,
258 F.2d 78, 80 (2d Cir. 1958).

42. Lee, 192 F.2d at 229 (citations omitted).
43. Id. (citing Cross mistakenly). The Second Circuit repeated this mistake in Vareltzis.

See 258 F.2d at 80.
44. 275 F.2d 188 (2d Cir. 1960).
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retreated from this position to once again embrace the Baldwin
principle.1
The Sixth Circuit, on the other hand, had a different
analysis of the question of whether federal or state law applied.
In the earliest case, McCrate v. Morgan Packing
S 41Co.,46 the Sixth
Circuit, citing Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, first held that
Ohio's "two issue" rule did not apply.48 Subsequently, in
Volasco Products Co. v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co.,4 the court
suggested that under the right circumstances, the state's "two
issue" rule might apply. The court explained that Erie required a
federal appellate court to follow the state "two issue" rule only
when jurisdiction was founded on diversity and state law
governed the substantive issues in the case; however, since
Volasco arose under the federal antitrust laws, the Baldwin
principle applied. ° In subsequent cases, the Sixth Circuit
maintained this distinction between cases based on diversity or
federal question jurisdiction.'
In summary, in the early part of the twentieth century, the
Supreme Court articulated and gradually extended the Baldwin
principle, and the lower federal appellate courts, especially the
Fifth and Eighth Circuits, began to entrench it into the case law.
A question arose, however, as to whether (and when) a federal
9

45. Id. at 190-91 (citing D.C. and Fifth Circuit cases adhering to the Baldwin principle
and neglecting to mention any of the previous Second Circuit cases applying a "two issue"
rule).
46. 117 F.2d 702 (6th Cir. 1941).
47. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
48. McCrate, 117 F.2d at 704-05 (citing Erie and noting that Ohio's "two issue" rule
did not apply). See also Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Rochelle, 252 F.2d 730 (6th Cir.
1958) (Tennessee's two-issue rule applied); A. Coastline R.R. Co. v. Smith, 264 F.2d 428
(6th Cir. 1959) (same).
49. 308 F.2d 383 (6th Cir. 1962).
50. Id. at 390 ("This case is tried under federal law where the 'two issue' rule is not
applicable.") (citing Wilmington).
51. In Elder-Beerman Stores Corp. v. FederatedDepartment Stores, Inc., 459 F.2d 138
(6th Cir. 1972), the Sixth Circuit, as in Valasco, also upheld the applicability of the
Baldwin principle in federal antitrust cases. Id. at 147-148 (noting that the conclusion is in
accord with Sunkist Growers). In other cases based on diversity jurisdiction and state law,
the court found the state "two issue" rule to govern. See Keet v. Serv. Mach. Co., Inc., 472
F.2d 138, 140 (6th Cir. 1972) (applying Ohio's "two issue" rule); Adkins v. Ford Motor
Co., 446 F.2d 1105, 1108 (6th Cir. 1971) (applying Tennessee's "two issue" rule and
stating that "[w]here jurisdiction is founded upon diversity of citizenship and state-created
rights are sought to be enforced, this Court has consistently construed a general verdict as
the state courts would.").
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appellate court should apply a state's "two issue" rule or the
federal Baldwin principle, an issue complicated by the
emergence of a nascent Erie doctrine. Two approaches
developed. The Seventh Circuit, relying on its interpretation of
Wilmington, held that state law applied whenever the appellant
had failed to object to the alleged error at the trial court level,
and the Second Circuit, for a time, agreed with this position. In
contrast, the Sixth Circuit held that state law applied whenever
jurisdiction was premised on diversity and the action was
governed by state law. Otherwise, in cases governed by federal
law, the Baldwin principle applied.
III. THE EFFICACY OF THE BALDWIN PRINCIPLE IN THE MODERN
ERA

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the federal appellate
courts began to develop a more discretionary standard in
considering the disposition of multi-faceted general verdicts in
which an error lay in one facet. Two prominent approaches
developed-the Ninth Circuit's Traver rule and the harmless
error doctrine-although in practice they seemed to be
functionally equivalent. In addition, the courts recognized three
new arguments to reconcile discretion with the Baldwin
principle. First, many circuit courts reinterpreted the Baldwin
line of cases as holding only that the vacate-and-remand
technique was appropriate if it was not possible to ascertain
whether the jury based its general verdict on an invalid claim.
The Baldwin line of cases was conditional, and as a result, it left
open the possibility of a discretionary harmless error rule. A
second line of reasoning used by the circuit courts posited that
the federal appellate courts were bound by federal harmless error
provisions enacted after the development of the Baldwin
principle. These provisions trumped, according to some circuits.
Third, courts suggested that the Supreme Court's decisions in
the criminal context applying a discretionary harmless error
analysis justified departure from the absolute civil rule coming
from Baldwin. During this time period, the reconciliation of
these competing lines of reasoning often occurred in dicta. More
and more courts began to discuss the possibility of a
discretionary harmless error rule, but very few decisions actually
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exercised it. Finally, the old questions of conflicts of law and
waiver remained, and the federal courts continued to struggle
with the issue.
A. The Emergence of a DiscretionaryRule.
During the modem era, the circuit courts developed two
types of discretionary rules: the Ninth Circuit's Traver rule and
the harmless error rule developed by the other circuits. Both
involved an element of discretion, and both could be seen as
efforts to conserve scarce judicial resources.
1. The Ninth Circuit'sTraver Rule.
In Traver v. Meshriy,52 the Ninth Circuit, speaking
through then-Judge Anthony Kennedy, articulated what has
become known as the Traver rule. William Traver, a collector of
antique American clocks, alleged a variety of causes of action
(including false imprisonment, assault, slander, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, and a Section 1983 claim)
against myriad Bank of America officers who had initially
refused to let him withdraw $1,000 from his account to purchase
a valuable clock and subsequently detained him. A general
verdict was returned in favor of Traver. On appeal, the Ninth
Circuit noted that the Section 1983 claim against the bank itself,
based on a theory of respondeat superior, was likely
insufficient. 3 Judge Kennedy, however, found it unnecessary to
pass on this question because he held that:
Where more than one theory of recovery has been
submitted to the jury in a civil case, and where on appeal it
is claimed that as to one of the theories there was a lack of
evidential support or an error of law in submitting the
theory to the jury, the reviewing court has discretion to
construe a general verdict as attributableto another theory
if it was supported by substantial evidence and was
submitted to the jury free from error.14
Judge Kennedy relied on the Seventh Circuit's Cross
52. 627 F.2d 934 (9th Cir. 1980).

53. Id. at 938.
54. Id. (emphasis added).
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decision and the Sixth Circuit's Adkins decision as the basis for
this holding. However, neither Cross nor Adkins supports this
decision. First, the Cross decision ignored the distinction of
Wilmington explained in the Firemen's Insurance decision and,
indeed, even if it had recognized the distinction, the fact that the
appellant in Cross had not objected made Wilmington binding on
it. This is, therefore, an instance of harm caused by the Cross
decision dicta as discussed above.55 Perhaps we could excuse
Judge Kennedy for this one mis-citation, but it should be clear
that, like Cross, the valid distinction of Wilmington described in
Firemen'sInsurance does not apply here. Judge Kennedy makes
no mention of whether the appellants had objected at trial to the
use of a general verdict. If they had, under the Firemen's
Insurance decision the Baldwin principle would apply. If they
had not, it would be a question of state law, and Judge Kennedy
makes no mention of what California law is on this subject.
Second, even if Cross was adequately supported in law itself, it
does not support the proposition for which Judge Kennedy cites
it. The Cross decision holds that a court has an obligation, under
the "two issue" rule, to affirm the generalized verdict if any of
the theories of liability is supported by evidence. It speaks of a
duty, not discretion. Third, Judge Kennedy's cite to the Sixth
Circuit's Adkins decision also is misguided. The Adkins decision
holds that the Baldwin rule applies whenever jurisdiction is not
premised solely on diversity jurisdiction. In this case, however,
Traver based jurisdiction on 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and § 1343, not
28 U.S.C. § 1332.56 Thus, Judge Kennedy's decision (and the
Traver rule) should be considered controversial from the start.
Nevertheless, Judge Kennedy promulgated a number of
factors to help inform future appellate discretion:
[1] the potential for confusion of the jury which may have
resulted from an erroneous submission of a particular claim
or cause of action, 7 [2] whether privileges or defenses of
the losing party apply to the count upon which the verdict is
being sustained so that they would have been considered by
55. See supra n. 39 and accompanying text.

56. Traver, 627 F.2d at 936.
57. In subsequent cases, the Ninth Circuit has found a strong likelihood of jury
confusion where the case is complex, such as an antitrust case, or where the factual and
legal issues are intermingled. See infra n. 60.
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the jury with reference to the count, [3] the strength of the
evidence supporting the count being relied upon to sustain
the verdict, and [4] the extent to which the same disputed
issues of fact apply to one or more of the theories in
question"

Based on these factors, Judge Kennedy found that
Traver's case was "an appropriate case to exercise our
discretion to construe the general verdict as attributable to the
state tort law theories of recovery." 5 9 The court failed to mention
the first factor specifically.6 ° It did note, however, with regard to
the second factor, that the "defenses of reasonable conduct and
action taken in good faith were fully applicable to the state
claims [as well as the § 1983 claim against the bank]." 6 The
58. Traver, 627 F.2d at 938-39. For an excellent overview of how these factors have
played out in the case law, see Hendry v. Exide Elecs. Corp., No. C-89-0077 SAW, 1992
WL 217785, at *2-5 (9th Cir. 1992).
59. Traver, 627 F.2d at 939.
60. Ironically, in other cases, the court's discretionary inquiry has often turned on this
factor. The court has found a strong likelihood of confusion where the case is complex,
such as an antitrust case, where the legal issue is unsettled, or where the factual and legal
issues are intermingled. See Syufy Enters. v. Am. Multicinema, Inc., 793 F.2d 990, 10011003 (9th Cir. 1986) (refusing to exercise discretion under first and third factors where
"the jury was confronted with a complex case involving multiple antitrust theories" and
"each claim also involved distinctive legal and factual components"); Malone v. Cal. St.
College, Stanislaus, No. CV-84-00601-EDP, 1993 WL 51303, at **3-6 (9th Cir. 1993)
(refusing to exercise discretion to uphold verdict, after disparate impact claim rejected on
appeal, under all four factors, but most prominently because "the potential for confusion of
the jury was substantial due to the erroneous submission of the retaliatory discharge claim
to the jury without any admonition regarding the elements of this theory of liability");
Hesse v. Air France, 1990 WL 58237, at **2-4 (9th Cir. 1990) (refusing to exercise
discretion due to "the intermingled nature of [plaintiff's] claims, [and] the confusion in the
law [of wrongful discharge] at the time of trial"); Kern v. Levolor Lorentzen, Inc., 899 F.2d
772, 791-92 (9th Cir. 1990) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (arguing that interrelation of age
discrimination and breach of contract claims confused jury). It should be noted, however,
that the court has occasionally found that the jury is unlikely to be confused. See Knapp v.
Ernst & Whinney, 90 F.3d 1431, 1440 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting that separation of issues
rendered jury unlikely to be confused). In addition, on at least one occasion, the court
emphasized that there is little likelihood of jury confusion where the appellant's lawyer
stressed the valid claim during the trial's closing arguments. See Kern, 899 F.2d at 777
(exercising discretion where no possibility of jury confusion existed because appellee's
counsel stressed proper claim during closing argument and where "[a]ge discrimination
was offered not as an independent ground for recovery, but only as a possible explanation
for ... disparate treatment" ).
61. Traver, 627 F.2d at 939. In subsequent cases, the Ninth Circuit has emphasized
that the defenses between the claims should be nearly identical. Otherwise, it has reasoned
that the jury could have found for the appellee on any one claim without necessarily being
compelled to reject a valid defense that was applicable only to that separate claim. See
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third factor also was satisfied because there was "ample
evidence to sugport an award to the plaintiff based upon [the
state claims]." Finally, under the fourth factor, the court noted
that
[T]he section 1983 claim is all but derivative of the state
torts alleged in the claim and the facts bearing upon it are
substantially the same. A jury finding of liability on a
section 1983 claim would necessarily encompass a finding
of liability on one or more of the state law claims, and state
law provides for the employer's liability in this instance for
the state torts committed by the employees in the scope of
their employment.63
Therefore, Judge Kennedy held that the Ninth Circuit
would exercise its discretion to construe the general verdict as
applicable to the state claims against the individuals and the
bank itself, notwithstanding that it doubted the viability of a

Knapp, 90 F.3d at 1440 (defenses applied equally to both counts); Kern, 899 F.2d at 777
(same). But see Oglesby v. S.P. Trans. Co., 6 F.3d 603, 610 (9th Cir. 1993) (refusing to
exercise discretion under second and fourth factors where defense of comparative
negligence is available under negligence claim but not under Boiler Inspection Act claim);
Hendry, 1992 WL 217785 at **4 (refusing to exercise discretion where there were different
defenses to each of five theories of liability).
62. Traver, 627 F.2d at 939. The Ninth Circuit has really provided little meat on the
bones of this factor. It is inherently a subjective assessment of the merits of the appellant's
case. It is important to note, however, that the Ninth Circuit does require more than
marginal evidence. See Syufy, 793 F.2d at 1001-1003 (refusing to exercise discretion under
first and third factors where the evidence of the surviving theories was "marginal").
63. Traver, 627 F.2d at 939 (citing California cases). In many subsequent cases, the
factual similarities analysis is subsumed within the first factor, but occasionally it is
analyzed separately. The court seems to require virtually identical disputed issues of fact;
however, on occasion, the court may exercise discretion where the facts and evidence
regarding the valid claim are a subset of the facts and evidence regarding the improper
claim. See Lancer Ins. Co. v. D.W. Ferguson & Assoc., No. CIV 91-3314 ER, 1995 WL
21705, **3 (9th Cir. 1995) (refusing to exercise discretion on ground that "disputed issues
of fact were different as between the contract and tort theories" and only one of five
theories of recovery survived appellate review); Counts v. Burlington N.R.R. Co., 952 F.2d
1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 1991) (refusing to exercise discretion where facts used for several
theories, such as lack of consideration, mutual mistake, economic duress, fraud in
inducement, "were not largely identical"). But see Knapp, 90 F.3d at 1441-42 (exercising
discretion where facts regarding deceptive statement and scienter were elements of both
primary and aiding and abetting liability under SEC Rule lOb-5); Kern, 889 F.2d at 778
(exercising discretion where facts were "largely identical," except that invalid claim
required additional evidence).
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respondeat superior theory against the bank under Section
1983.64
In subsequent cases, the Ninth Circuit continued to pay lip
service to the Baldwin rule, but the Traver rule has been so
consistently recognized and applied that it is safe to say that the
Ninth Circuit has entrenched the discretionary principle in its
case law. With respect to the Traver factors, in Hendry v. Exide
Electronics Corp., the court, summarizing the Ninth Circuit case
law on this issue, noted that it balances these factors "in an ad
hoc manner, without any one factor being accorded particular
weight and without necessarily considering all four factors in
each case."65 The court has on occasion applied the Traver rule
to affirm a general verdict without any mention of the factors,66

and yet, in some cases, a problem with one of the factors is
enough for the court to refuse to exercise discretion.67 The Traver
rule is thus a free-form inquiry giving the appellate court carte
blanche to affirm or reverse a general verdict without any
coherent unifying principle.
Not every Ninth Circuit judge, however, embraces the
Traver rule. Judge Kozinski, in particular, has launched a
scathing attack on it, arguing that it blatantly flouts binding
Supreme Court precedent:
64. Traver, 627 F.2d at 938-39.
65. Hendry, 1992 WL 217785 at **3 (analyzing three factors). See also Kelly v. City of
Oakland, 198 F.3d 779, 785 (9th Cir. 1999) (exercising discretion upon analysis of all four
factors); Knapp, 90 F.3d at 1439-42 (affirming district court's invocation of Traver
discretion based on analysis of all four factors to sustain a general verdict against a
subsequent motion for a new trial where one of the claims was mooted by a Supreme Court
decision); Kern, 899 F.2d at 777-79 (exercising discretion upon analysis of all four factors);
Nutri-metics Intl., Inc. v. CarringtonLabs, Inc., No. CV-87-0935-RMT, 1992 WL 389246
(9th Cir. 1992) (exercising discretion upon informal analysis of last three factors); Benigni
v. City of Hemet, 879 F.2d 473, 480 (9th Cir. 1988) (exercising discretion on the basis of
two factors). But see Malone, 1993 WL 51303 at **3-6 (refusing to exercise discretion on
poor showing of all four factors); Portland Feminist Women's Health Ctr. v. Advocates for
Life, Inc., 62 F.3d 280, 285-86 (9th Cir. 1994) (applying Traver rule where one claim was
rendered moot by a Supreme Court decision, but refusing to exercise discretion based on
third and fourth factors); Syufy, 793 F.2d at 1001-1003 (refusing to exercise discretion on
poor showing of only two factors); Oglesby, 6 F.3d at 610 (two factors).
66. See Roberts v. College of the Desert, 870 F.2d 1411 (9th Cir. 1988) (applying
Traver rule with no discussion of factors to affirm general verdict where it could be
attributed to either due process or equal protection claim).
67. See e.g. Lancer Ins., 1995 WL 21705 at **3 (refusing to exercise discretion on the
basis of poor showing of one factor); Hesse, 1990 WL 58237 at **2-3 (same); Counts, 952
F.2d at 1140-41 (same).
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More than a century ago, the Supreme Court explained that,
because we cannot read the minds of jurors, a general
verdict that may have been based on an improper theory of
liability must be reversed. "The verdict's generality
prevents us from perceiving upon which plea they found. If,
therefore, upon any one issue error was committed, either
in the admission of evidence, or in the charge of the court,
the verdict cannot be upheld" [citing Baldwin]. The Court
has three times reiterated the rule in unequivocal terms
[citing Wilmington, Halecki, and Sunkist Growers]. The
wisdom of this rule is beyond cavil. As one commentator
said of the general verdict: "No one but the jurors can tell
what was put into it and the jurors will not be heard to say.
The general verdict is as inscrutable and essentially
mysterious as the judgment which issued from the ancient
oracle of Delphi." When the Supreme Court speaks
consistently and repeatedly on an issue, the inferior federal
courts are bound to follow suit.... The Baldwin rule exists
precisely to deal with the kind of uncertainties this case
presents; fine tuning is unnecessary when the facts and law
coincide.68
In addition, Judge Kozinski chastised the Ninth Circuit's
"erosion of a perfectly good rule." 6 9 Although Traver may be
read as a narrow exception to the Baldwin principle, in
subsequent cases, Judge Kozinski complains, the Ninth Circuit
has neglected to even acknowledge the Supreme Court decisions
and the Baldwin principle. ° Judge Kozinski did not find this
surprising: "As is often the case when courts allow themselves
discretion to avoid absolute principles, the exceptions have now
submerged the rule."7 1 Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit as a whole

68. Kern, 899 F.2d at 790-792 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). See also Lucas v. J.C. Penney
Co., Inc., No. CV-93-01804-JCC, 1997 WL 730328 **2 (9th Cir. 1997). Ironically, Judge
Kozinski did not always feel so strongly about the precedential force of the Baldwin
principle. Indeed, in 1989, just a year before his Kern dissent, Judge Kozinski invoked the
Traver rule to uphold a general verdict where factual evidence was sufficient to support a
medical negligence verdict, despite the inadequacy of four of the eight factual theories
supporting that claim. See McCord v. Maguire, 873 F.2d 1271, 1273-74 (9th Cir. 1989)
(citing Landes, Syufy, and Traver).
69. Kern, 899 F.2d at 791.
70. Id.
71. Id.
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has so far resisted Judge Kozinski's challenge and consistently
applied the Traver rule.72
2. The Harmless ErrorException.
The Baldwin principle has also been somewhat eroded,
albeit a bit more gradually, in several other circuit courts.
Although these courts have styled their discretionary analysis a
"harmless error" exception to the Baldwin principle, it differs
little from the Traver rule. However, courts using the harmless
error rule have not applied it as often as the Ninth Circuit has
applied the Traver rule. Instead, most circuit courts attempt to
keep it cabined within rather strict bounds. It thus clings a little
more tightly to the Baldwin principle than the Traver rule does.
a. Genesis.
The genesis of a harmless error exception to the Baldwin
principle in the circuit courts occurred in the 1970s. In Amer.
Airlines, Inc. v. U.S., 3 the Fifth Circuit became the first circuit to
delineate a harmless error exception not based on a state "two
issue" rule, as in the Sixth and (arguably) the Seventh Circuit.74
An American Airlines jet had crashed on its approach to the
Greater Cincinnati Airport, killing fifty-eight out of sixty-two
people on board, and the families of the victims brought a suit
for wrongful death. The plaintiffs offered thirty-two theories of
negligence, and the jury returned a general verdict in favor of
the plaintiffs. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit found that "each and
every one of the elements was supported by substantial evidence
in the record, except one." 75 Yet, the court felt that it was
"inconceivable that in the mass of testimony so clearly
establishing negligence in thirty other particulars this issue could
have influenced the verdict against American," and thus, the
7

72. It would be interesting to see what Judge Kennedy would do if the Traver rule ever
got before the Supreme Court because he would be in the odd position of potentially having
to admit that the Traver rule-a rule he crafted-flouted the precedents of the Court on

which he now sits.
73. 418 F.2d 180 (5th Cir. 1969).
74. For Sixth Circuit cases, see supra nn. 48-51 and accompanying text; for Seventh

Circuit cases, see supra nn. 31-39 and accompanying text.
75. Am.Airlines, 418 F.2d at 195.
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court found "no justification for reversal and a new trial on such
insubstantial grounds." 7 6 Surprisingly, the Fifth Circuit cited
Wilmington for this proposition.77 According to its unique
reading of Wilmington, the Baldwin principle only applies "if it
is impossible to say upon which counts the verdict was based." 78
Although it is plausible to read Wilmington in this way,79 it is a

bit of a stretch to do so based on Baldwin as well as on both
Halecki and Sunkist Growers, which came after Wilmington but
before the instant case and did not speak in such conditional

terms.
Although American Airlines offered at least a plausible
attempt to distinguish Supreme Court precedent, it was
neglected outside of the Fifth Circuit. A trio of cases, however,

arising in the Second, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits became the
force that infused the harmless error exception into the case law
of the circuit courts across the nation.80 Ironically, the trio of
cases was less analytically sound than American Airlines.
Indeed, they dispensed with the obligation to conform to

Supreme Court precedent altogether.
With these four precedents on the books, the issue came
before the Second Circuit. In Morrissey v. National Maritime
Union of America," Judge Friendly, writing for the Second

Circuit panel, began his opinion by citing Halecki and the early
cases adhering to the Baldwin principle and noting that "the
language used is generally quite absolute."8 2 After recognizing

76. Id.
77. Id. The Fifth Circuit also cited to its earlier decision in Lyle v. Bentley, 406 F.2d
325, 327-28 (5th Cir. 1969), but apparently did not find it troubling that Lyle had actually
gone the other way. It had applied the general rule using language that suggested that it
was mandatory.
78. Am. Airlines, 418 F.2d at 195 (emphasis added).
79. Wilmington, 205 U.S. at 79 (stating that "and where it is impossible from the record
to say upon which of the counts of the declaration the verdict was based .. ") (emphasis
added).
80. See Gardner v. Gen. Motors Corp., 507 F.2d 525, 529 (10th Cir. 1974) ("Although
we might well hesitate to affirm the judgments if duty to warn were the single theory of
liability we consider plaintiff's other theories of recovery, none of which depend on jury
conclusions regarding duty to warn, to overwhelm any potential error in this regard.");
Collum v. Butler, 421 F.2d 1257, 1260 (7th Cir. 1970); Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell,
Inc., 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967).
81. 544 F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 1976).
82. Id. at 26-27.
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the existence of the harmless error exception in Collum,
Gardner, and Roginsky, Judge Friendly, without passing on the
merits of these cases, suggested that "the qualification on the
general rule of Halecki and other cases must be kept within
rather strict bounds."83 He then promptly held that the instant
case was not a proper case in which to exercise
84 discretion given
the high burden he felt necessary to invoke it.
Two years later, the Eighth Circuit, the court most
responsible for entrenching the Baldwin principle in the early
years, also came to embrace the harmless error exception, albeit
cautiously and without applying it. In Mueller v. Hubbard
Milling Co.,85 the Court was faced once again with a problematic
general verdict: "the insurmountable difficulty is that the
general verdicts returned by the jury ... may rest solely upon
the contract claims, which are tainted with the trial court's
erroneous and prejudicial admission of parol evidence." 86 After
quoting Judge Friendly's opinion in Morrissey at length,87 the
court held:
We are in agreement with [Judge Friendly's] analysis,
which is decisive here. First, there is no material distinction
between a situation, like that in Morrissey, in which one of
several theories of liability should not have been submitted
to the jury at all, and a situation, like that here, in which
one of several theories of liability is not sustainable because
of an erroneous and prejudicial admission of evidence. The
essential inquiry in either case is whether the appellate
court is fairly convinced that the jury proceeded on a sound
basis. Second, we are unable to say with any confidence
that the verdicts returned below rested on anything other
than the contract claims. Plaintiff's counsel stated in
closing argument: "Our principal focus has been on the
contract claims, the promises that John McNeal made...
83. Id.
84. Id. ("The jury was thus repeatedly invited to find for the plaintiff under either
section of the Landrum-Griffin Act. While it may be tempting to say that the jury could
not really have thought that Morrissey was entitled to a hearing before the police were
called, they had been told they could base their verdict on just that. As a practical matter,
judging from the large amount of punitive damages awarded, we would guess that the jury
sustained both theories of recovery." ).
85. 573 F.2d 1029 (8th Cir. 1978).
86. Id. at 1038.
87. Id. at1038-39 (quoting Morrissey, 544 F.2d at 26-27).

THE BALDWIN PRINCIPLE

A careful review of the record convinces us that all of the
plaintiff s theories were of marginal validity at best and that
the contract theory might well have provided the sole basis
for the verdicts."'

The Eighth Circuit thus agreed with Judge Friendly's
warning that the harmless error exception, if it was consistent
with the Baldwin line of cases, should be kept within rather strict
bounds, and it believed that a "fairly convinced" standard
would do that.
b. The Modern Harmless Error Exception.

The harmless error exception arose in the Second, Fifth,
Eighth, and Tenth Circuits. Going forward, however, the
application of the harmless error rule oscillated in these
circuits-a result that is perhaps unavoidable given the cycling
on multi-member courts. To be sure, the harmless error rule very
rarely has been applied to uphold a general verdict.

9

On the

theoretical issue, however, the circuit courts have been highly
inconsistent in their reasoning. After Mueller's articulation of a
narrow harmless error exception, the Eighth Circuit not only
never applied that exception, it did not even mention the
possibility of it again. 90 In the Second Circuit,9' the court, at least
until the 1998 opinion in Bruneau,9' consistently applied the
88. Id. at 1039 (emphasis added).
89. There have only been four cases outside of the Ninth Circuit that have exercised a
harmless error exception to the Baldwin line of cases. See Hurley v. Atlantic City Police
Dept., 174 F.3d 95, 120-22 (3d Cir. 1999) (finding harmless error to lie in a sexual
harassment case where a general verdict encompassing an improper quid pro quo theory of
liability was returned); Bruneau v. South Kortright C. Sch. Dist., 163 F.3d 749, 759-61 (2d
Cir. 1998) (finding harmless error to lie in a Title IX case); Henderson v. Winston, 59 F.3d
166 (4th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (finding harmless error to lie in a § 1983 action where one
element of a denial of due process theory of liability was improper); Braun v. Flynt, 731
F.2d 1205, 1206 (5th Cir. 1984) (finding harmless error to lie in an invasion of privacy case
where general verdict encompassed an invalid appropriation theory and a valid "false
light" theory because the focus of the case had been on the false light claim).
90. See E.I. DuPontde Nemours & Co. v. Berkeley & Co., 620 F.2d 1247, 1257-58 (8th
Cir. 1980); Bone v. Refco, Inc., 774 F.2d 235, 242-44 (8th Cir. 1985); Dudley v. Dittmer,
795 F.2d 669, 673-75 (8th Cir. 1986).
91. As noted above, the Second Circuit initially oscillated between adherence to the
"two issue" rule and the Baldwin principle in the early years. After Morrissey, however,
things evened out a bit during the 1980s and early 1990s.
92. 163 F.3d 749 (2d Cir. 1998). In this case, the Second Circuit broke from the past
two decades by invoking and applying a harmless error exception. Id. at 759-61. Judge
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general rule, 93 except

that it occasionally noted that it did possess
the power to apply a harmless error exception.94 Likewise, in the
Fifth Circuit, the court has also seemed to disfavor the harmless
error rule. After the American Airlines decision in 1969, it
issued a series of decisions applying the general rule without so
much as mentioning harmless error. 95 In the 1984 case of Braun
v. Flynt, however, the Fifth Circuit recognized the emergence of
Cardamone's opinion noted that Morrissey "specifically recognized the possibility of
applying harmless error analysis where appropriate to avoid the usual course of reversal
and new trial," and as a result, he felt that this was the appropriate case in which to do so.
Id. at 759 (citing Morrissey).
93. See Yentsch v. Texaco, Inc., 630 F.2d 46, 59 (2d Cir. 1980) (applying Baldwin
principle); Katara v. D.E. Jones Commodities, Inc., 835 F.2d 966, 971 (2d Cir. 1987)
(same); O'Neill v. Krzeminski, 839 F.2d 9, 12 (2d Cir. 1988) (same but extending it to a
jury answer to a single interrogatory that comprehends two distinct bases of liability); BAlI
Banking Corp. v. UPG, Inc., 985 F.2d 685, 704 (2d Cir. 1993).
94. See Yentsch, 630 F.2d at 59 ("Yenstch urges that we can nevertheless affirm the
judgment below if we are 'fairly convinced that the jury proceeded only on the sound
ground.' We have no confidence, however, that the jury based its decision exclusively on
the price-fixing claim, the only one sufficiently supported by the evidence to warrant
submission.").
95. See Jones v. Miles, 656 F.2d 103, 106-08 (5th Cir. 1981); Kicklighter v. Nails by
Jannee, Inc., 616 F.2d 734, 742 (5th Cir. 1980); King v. Ford Motor Co., 597 F.2d 436,
439 (5th Cir. 1979) (distinguishing between a harmless error rule for reviewing JNOV
motions and the Baldwin principle for reviewing motions for a new trial and general
appellate review); Dougherty v. Continental Oil Co., 579 F.2d 954, 960 & n. 2 (5th Cir.
1978); Smith v. S. Airways, Inc., 556 F.2d 1347, 1347-48 (5th Cir. 1977); Yoder Brothers,
Inc. v. Cal.-Fla. Plant Corp., 537 F.2d 1347 n. 48 (5th Cir. 1976) (Brown, C.J., dissenting).
In addition, it should be noted that the Eleventh Circuit adopted all of the Fifth Circuit's
case law prior to Oct. 1, 1981, as binding precedent. See Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661
F.2d 1206, 1209 (11 th Cir. 1981) (en banc). There is in consequence a certain amount of
path dependence in its case law, and many of its opinions rely heavily on the King decision.
See Carroll Kenworth Truck Sales, Inc. v. Kenworth Truck Co., 781 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11 th
Cir. 1986); Royal Typewriter Co. v. Xerographic Supplies Corp., 719 F.2d 1092, 1098-99
(11th Cir. 1983); Hunter v. Reardon Smith Lines, Ltd., 719 F.2d 1108, 1113 & n.15 (11 th
Cir. 1983) (applying Baldwin principle, but noting in a footnote that if assuming arguendo
the harmless error exception applied, reversal was nonetheless required); Walden v. U.S.
Steel Corp., 759 F.2d 834, 838 (11th Cir. 1985); Michigan Abrasive Co., v. Poole, 805
F.2d 1001, 1005 (11th Cir. 1986) (relying on mistaken reading of Walden as relying on
state law); Maccabees Mut. Lif. Ins. Co. v. Morton, 941 F.2d 1181, 1184 (11 th Cir. 1991);
Cronin v. Washington Natl. Ins. Co., 980 F.2d 663, 669 n .7 (11th Cir. 1993); Richards v.
Michelin Tire Corp., 21 F.3d 1048, 1055-56 (11 th Cir. 1994) (relying on King's (as cited in
Carroll Kenworth and Cronin) distinction between the rule applicable to JNOV and new
trial motions). But see O'Donnell v. Ga. Osteopathic Hosp., Inc., 748 F.2d 1543,1549 (11 th
Cir. 1984) (applying "two issue" rule and failing to distinguish between JNOV and new
trial motions). Oddly, the Eleventh Circuit seems to place much more faith in the
soundness of the King distinction than does the Fifth Circuit itself, or any other circuit for
that matter. It appears to be the only circuit to attach any significance to the JNOV/newtrial motion distinction.
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a harmless error rule in other circuits, but ironically not the
American Airlines decision. It applied the rule to a general
verdict encompassing a valid "false light" claim and an invalid
appropriation claim because the focus of the case was on the
"false light" claim.9" Yet, after Braun became one of the rare
cases in which harmless error was found, the Fifth Circuit only
mentioned the possibility of harmless error in two out of the next
seven cases and applied it in neither case.97 The Tenth Circuit
has done the same. 9s Thus, in the circuits that originated the
harmless error exception, there has been little enthusiasm for it
in subsequent cases.
It should be noted that three out of the four cases in which
the court applied the harmless error exception were handed
down in the past six years, perhaps indicating an increased

96. Braun, 731 F.2d at 1206.
97. The cases not mentioning the possibility of harmless error and applying the
Baldwin principle include Ratner v. Sioux Natural Gas Corp., 770 F.2d 512, 518 (5th Cir.
1985); Neubauer v. City of McAllen, 766 F.2d 1567, 1575-78 (5th Cir. 1985); Nowell v.
Universal Electric Co., 792 F.2d 1310, 1312 (5th Cir. 1986); Pan Eastern Exploration Co.

v. Hufo Oils, 855 F.2d 1106, 1123-25 (5th Cir. 1988) (noting general rule, but holding that
appellant had waived the right by arguing only that none of the possible theories of
recovery were supported by the evidence, not that the cause should be reversed and
remanded if any one of the theories was invalid) and Crist v. Dickson Welding, Inc., 957
F.2d 1281, 1286 (5th Cir. 1992). The cases briefly mentioning the possibility of harmless
error but adhering to the Baldwin principle include Olney Savings & Loan Association v.
Trinity Banc Savings Association, 885 F.2d 266, 271 (5th Cir. 1989) (recognizing Baldwin

principle and Braun's harmless error exception but not applying because there was
sufficient evidence to support all the claims) and Ward v. Freeman, 854 F.2d 780, 790 (5th
Cir. 1988) (noting both but applying the Baldwin principle).
98. See Collis v. Ashland Oil & Refining Co., 722 F.2d 625, 627 (10th Cir. 1983)

(applying general rule without discussion of harmless error exception); Asbill v. Hous.
Auth. of Choctaw Nation of Ok., 726 F.2d 1499, 1504 (10th Cir. 1984) (applying general
rule although discussing and justifying harmless error exception); Smith v. FMC Corp., 754
F.2d 873, 877 (10th Cir. 1985) (applying general rule without discussion of harmless error
exception); McMurray v.Deere & Co., 858 F.2d 1436, 1445-46 (10th Cir. 1988) (same). In
Farrell v. Klein Tools, Inc., 866 F.2d 1294, 1298-1300 (10th Cir. 1989), the court discussed
the issue at length and acknowledged that the "law on this subject is not characterized by
any great clarity." Id. at 1299. After canvassing the cases supporting both the Baldwin
principle and the harmless error exception, the court stated that it felt itself bound by its
two most recent opinions in Smith and McMurrary, "both of which strictly imposed the
general rule." Id. at 1298-1300. Thus, despite the fact that it appeared "very unlikely that
the submission of the instruction on [an invalid defense] significantly influenced the jury or
prejudiced Farrell's substantial rights," the court "reluctantly" applied the
Baldwin principle. Id. at 1300-01.
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willingness to use it.99 In addition to the Second Circuit's
Bruneau decision in 1998, two of these cases arose in circuits
that had been much stronger adherents (as compared to the four
circuits that originated the harmless error exception) to the
Baldwin principle during the debate that arose in the 1970s and
1980s. The Fourth Circuit, for example, had adhered to the
Baldwin principle throughout this time. l°° But in the 1995 case of
Henderson v. Winston,'°l the Fourth Circuit issued a per curiam
opinion applying a harmless error exception in the context of a
verdict for the defendant. °2It distinguished Sunkist Growers:
[T]he rationale for the Sunkist rule ... is that a reviewing

court cannot be certain that the legal basis for the verdict
was valid, meaning that prejudice is necessarily established.
Here, by contrast, there was only one theory of liability
pressed, and there is no doubt that [a critical element of the
theory of liability] went against the plaintiff. Hence, even if
the jury did err on one of the other elements, the verdict for
defendant was still unquestionably valid."3
The Third Circuit likewise consistently had applied the
Baldwin principle up until 1999;'0° however, in Hurley v.
99. Braun was the exception, having been decided in 1984 by the Fifth Circuit. In the
early 1980s, the First Circuit, despite proclaiming allegiance to the Baldwin principle,
articulated a subset theory of the harmless error exception, In two cases, Brochu v. Ortho
PharmaceuticalCorp., 642 F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1981) and Shepp v. Uehlinger, 775 F.2d 452,
456-57 (1st Cir. 1985), the First Circuit applied an extraordinarily narrow harmless error
exception where the elements of the valid theory of liability were a subset of the invalid
theory of liability minus the invalid element. I do not, however, consider these applications
of the harmless error exception to be of the same genus as those mentioned in the text,
largely because they seem to be the result of a fluke. Indeed, not even Judge Kozinski
views the First Circuit's subset theory as in the same genus as the discretionary harmless
error rules. See Kern, 899 F.2d at 790 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) ("Brochu involved a very
rare situation and, in the few cases where it applies, the Brochu rule is fully consistent with
Baldwin."). Apart from Brochu and Shepp, the First Circuit has steadfastly adhered to the
Baldwin principle. See Levinsky's, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 127 F.3d 122, 134 (1st
Cir. 1997); Lattimore v. PolaroidCorp., 99 F.3d 456, 468 (1st Cir. 1996); Kassel v. Gannet
Co., 875 F.2d 935, 950 (1st Cir. 1989).
100. See Ely v. Blevins, 706 F.2d 479, 480 (4th Cir. 1983); Gill v. Rollins Protection
Serv. Co., 722 F.2d 55, 59 (4th Cir. 1983); Flowers v. Tandy Corp., 773 F.2d 585, 591 (4th
Cir. 1985).
101. 59 F.3d 166 (4th Cir. 1995) (per curiam).
102. Id. at **5.
103. Id.
104. The Third Circuit had steadfastly maintained that its Albergo decision in the early
years, supported by the Supreme Court's Halecki decision, counseled in favor of the
Baldwin principle. See Simko v. C & C Maint. Co., 594 F.2d 960, 967-68 (3d Cir. 1979);
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Atlantic City Police Department,'5 Chief Judge Becker, relying
both on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 61 and the proposition
that the Baldwin principle is narrow and does not apply where
the record made it possible to determine the basis for the jury's
decision, held that the harmless error exception applied where a
jury returned a general verdict that encompassed an improper
quid pro quo theory of sexual harassment.' °6 In a dissent
bordering on disgust, Judge Cowen, echoing but not citing Judge
Kozinski's Kern dissent, sharply criticized the majority's
departure from both circuit and Supreme Court precedents:
[O]ur precedents could not be more clear [in applying the
Baldwin principle]. ... The Supreme Court has been
equally consistent in holding that a general verdict in a civil
case must be reversed if any of the claims submitted to the
jury are found to be unsound. ... Since Baldwin, the
Supreme Court has reaffirmed this rule, without exception,
on at least three separate occasions. ... [T]he fact of the
matter is that prior to today's decision, this court has never
relied on a harmless error analysis to affirm a general
verdict that may have rested on an improper ground. It is
remarkable that after more than one hundred years of
reviewing civil judgments founded on general verdicts, the
majority believes that we have only now come upon the
case that calls for such drastic action. I do not believe that
that day has arrived.0 7
But Judge Cowen did not stop there. As a policy matter,
he argued that the Baldwin rule made perfect sense:
[C]an any of us really purport to know how the jury viewed
the evidence in this case? Any experienced trial lawyer can
attest to the fact that juries sometimes view cases in
surprising ways. ... I am very concerned that the
majority's newly-minted harmless error analysis will invite
further efforts by appellate judges, in even more difficult
cases, to divine what a jury may have been thinking when it
Avins v. White, 627 F.2d 637, 646 (3d Cir. 1980); Carden v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 850
F.2d 996, 1000-1003 (3d Cir. 1988); Limbach Co. v. Sheet Metal Workers Intl. Assn., 949
F.2d 1211, 1217-18 (3d Cir. 1991); Rush v. Scott Specialty Gases, Inc., 113 F.3d 476, 485
(3d Cir. 1997); Wilburn v. Maritrans GP, Inc., 139 F.3d 350, 361 (3d Cir. 1998);
Brokerage Concepts, Inc. v. U.S. Healthcare,Inc., 140 F.3d 494, 533-35 (3d Cir. 1998).
105. 174 F.3d 95 (3d Cir. 1999).
106. Id. at 120-22.
107. Id. at 135-37 (citations omitted).
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rendered a general verdict. Although the majority
emphasizes that their decision to employ a harmless-error
doctrine is founded upon the "extreme" facts of this case,
that is simply to say that we will only affirm a tainted
general verdict in the future when we believe that the jury
has reached an obviously correct result. Because I believe
that we have no role in speculating how a jury might have
viewed the evidence presented at trial, and that such
attempts at judicial telepathy are unwise and contrary to our
precedents, I respectfully dissent. '08

It thus seems that the harmless error exception has
become more prevalent in the last six years.' °9 Indeed, in recent
years, the question has now turned to what level of confidence is
required that an error was harmless. Some circuits have set a
standard of "reasonable certainty," " others have cast the
standard in terms of "sufficient confidence.""' The Tenth
Circuit, in particular, has struggled with this standard. Initially,
the standard was reasonable certainty." 2 In subsequent cases,
however, the Tenth Circuit beefed up the standard to require
absolute certainty." 3 The absolute certainty standard is, of
108. Id. at 137-38 (citations omitted). In addition, Judge Cowen noted that: "[t]he
invocation of a harmless error rule in this case is particularly misguided because it will
produce no benefit to either the judicial system or the parties. As the Supreme Court has
recognized [in other contexts], the chief justification of the harmless error doctrine is the
conservation of judicial resources. But in this case, as a consequence of our decision to
vacate the punitive damages award against the ACPD and the liability judgments against
Madamba and in favor of Rifice, the entire matter will have to be re-presented to a new
jury. There is thus no efficiency advantage to support the majority's approach." Id. at 138
(citations omitted).
109. In a 1996 article, David Axelrad and Loren Kraus had argued that, apart from the
First Circuit's subset theory decision, "none of the other courts that have referred to a
possible harmless error exception has found it applicable." See David M. Axelrad & Loren
Homer Kraus, The Federal General Verdict Rule: Conflict in the Courts of Appeal, 43 Fed.
Law. 43, 43 (June 1996). As illustrated, this is no longer the case.
110. In the Fifth Circuit, the standard is reasonable certainty. See Braun, 731 F.2d at
1206 ("reasonably certain"); Olney, 885 F.2d at 271 ("reasonably certain"); Ward, 854
F.2d at 790 ("reasonably certain"). The Fourth Circuit concurs in this standard.
Henderson, 1995 WL 378602 at **5 ("reasonably certain") (citing Braun).
11. The Second Circuit employs a sufficient confidence standard. See Bruneau, 163
F.3d at 759-61 ("sufficient confidence").
112. See Asbill, 726 F.2d at 1504
113. See Farrell, 866 F.2d at 1301 ("However, because we cannot say with absolute
certainty, as required by McMurray and Smith, that the jury was not influenced by the
submission of the abnormal use instruction, we must reverse and remand for a new trial.");
Anixter, 77 F.3d at 1229 ("[W]e have adhered strictly to the general rule and have
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course, extraordinarily narrow, and it is perhaps functionally
equivalent to the Baldwin principle."1 4 Although these decisions
recognize the possibility that the Supreme Court's precedents
could be read to embrace a harmless error exception, as
described below, they jack the standard up so high that they
basically restore the Baldwin principle without overruling the
earlier decision recognizing the harmless error doctrine.
Coupled with the widespread emergence of the harmless
error exception in recent years are the modem circuit courts'
attempts to assert new justifications for departing from the
Baldwin principle and for downplaying the force of Supreme
Court precedent. In Asbill v. Housing Authority of the Choctaw
Nation of Oklahoma,"5 a decision heavily relied upon in Chief
Judge Becker's Hurley opinion,"6 the Tenth Circuit noted that
the Court's precedents "[do] not paint with as broad a brush as
appears." "7Instead, it believed that there was a statutory basis
for the harmless error exception: "As with all errors committed
at trial, a litmus test for reversal is whether the appellant was
thereby unjustly prejudiced."" 8
Judge Barrett's opinion apparently sought to escape the
vice of the Baldwin line of precedent by asserting that the
promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure-and in
particular Rule 61-after Baldwin and Wilmington somehow
abrogated the decision, and similarly, that the enactment of 28
U.S.C. § 2111 after Halecki and Sunkist Growers somehow
abrogated them as well. In addition, Judge Barrett reread
Wilmington to apply to only "vital" errors that are prejudicial to
the "substantial rights" of the objecting party-terms that are
mirrored in Rule 61 and 28 U.S.C. § 2111. Yet, it is unclear
what precisely Judge Barrett meant. Was he suggesting that the
Baldwin line of cases was still authoritative, but included a never
before discovered harmless error exception pregnant in its
language? Of course, Wilmington could not be read as referring

remanded cases where we could not say 'with absolute certainty' that the jury was not
influenced by the submission of the improper or erroneous instruction.").
114. See the discussion in Hurley, 174 F.3d at 137 n. 4 (Cowen, J., dissenting).
115. 726 F.2d 1499 (10th Cir. 1984).
116. Hurley, 174 F.3d at 121-22.
117. Asbill, 726 F.2d at 1504.
118. Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 61; 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (1976)).
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to Rule 61 or Section 2111 because it came before their
enactment. But maybe Judge Barrett was suggesting the
opposite-that enactment of Rule 61 and Section 2111 was
premised on a reading of Wilmington and, because of that, the
application of the statutory rule was fully consistent with
Supreme Court precedent. The opinion is a bit confusing, but as
will be discussed in Part IV, Judge Barrett may have been on to
something.
The courts could also escape the Baldwin line of cases by
referring to Supreme Court precedent in the criminal context that
applied the harmless error exception. However, the only circuit
to attempt to do so was the Second. In Bruneau, Judge
Cardamone's opinion applying a harmless error exception
asserted that the Supreme Court's criminal rule, as discussed in
Kotteakos v. U.S."9 was authoritative.'20 In Kotteakos, the Court
had indeed applied a harmless error analysis to affirm a criminal
conviction tainted by an improper theory of liability. The
problem with Judge Cardamone's importation of this rule into
the civil context was that the Wilmington decision strongly
suggested that the criminal rule is inapplicable, although it failed
to elaborate on this point. 2' At the very least, then, Judge
Cardamone should have resolved this embarrassing conflict.
Ironically, in the Fifth Circuit, the court invoked two
Supreme Court criminal cases for precisely the opposite
reason-to support the Baldwin principle. In Neubauer, the Fifth
Circuit relied heavily on the Supreme Court's criminal decisions
in Stromberg v. California22 and Zant v. Stephens'23 to justify a
harmless error exception. 24 Thus, in both the Second and the
Fifth Circuits, the courts transposed the Court's criminal
decisions, albeit to reach opposite results. As will be discussed
in Part IV, however, both of these decisions are flawed in that

119. 328 U.S. 750, 764 (1946).
120. Bruneau, 163 F.3d at 760.
121. See Wilmington, 205 U.S. at 78 ("And, of course, in a case like the one we are
considering we cannot maintain the verdict, as might be done in a criminal case upon a
general verdict of guilty upon all the counts of an indictment.") (emphasis added).
122. 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
123. 462 U.S. 862 (1983).
124. Neubauer, 766 F.2d at 1575-76.
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they fail to take into account crucial distinctions in the fabric of
the Court's criminal and civil jurisprudence on this issue.
Finally, it should be noted that the harmless error
exception is inherently discretionary, and in many cases, the
analysis of whether harmless error lies often tracks the Traver
factors delineated by then-Judge Kennedy: potential for jury
confusion; joint applicability of defenses; strength of evidence
of proper claims; and factual similarities. For example, like the
Traver factor involving potential jury confusion, the harmless
error analysis has often turned on whether parties stressed the
proper claim at trial and in closing arguments. A second
example is the comparability between the "factual similarities"
factor of the Traver rule and the First Circuit's subset theory. In
Brochu v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 25 the First Circuit,
despite professing its adherence to the Baldwin principle, noted:
The case at bar, however, is unusual in that the elements
needed for fraud and for strict liability corresponded,
except that [the potentially invalid fraud claim] required an
additional element. If the jury erroneously thought this
element was established, and wrongly concluded that there
was fraud, it necessarily and warrantably must have found
all the elements establishing strict liability. Since the
damages were the same in either event ... defendant was
not harmed.
Rather, it was a case where all roads led to
26
Rome.1

The subset theory of harmless error, as this line of
reasoning has become known, was also applied by the First
Circuit in Shepp v. Uehlinger.2 7 To be sure, the subset theory is
2
a bit narrower than the Traver rule's factual similarities factor,1 8
but the underlying principle is the same-harmless error will lie
where the jury must consider the same evidence on two different

125. 642 F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1981).
126. Id. at 662.
127. 775 F.2d 452, 456-57 (1st Cir. 1985) ("To have found liability under the

indemnification theory, the jury, as instructed, would have had to find liability under the
'breach of contract' theory; thus, even if we assume some error of presentation as a matter

of New York indemnification law (and if we assume a proper objection), any error of the
sort here claimed was harmless.").
128. It requires that the elements of the valid theory of liability be a subset of the invalid
theory of liability, rather than requiring just a similarity between the evidence needed to
establish the elements of two different theories of liability.
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theories of liability encompassed in a general verdict.129 In this
sense, it seems for the most part as if the Traver rule is really
just the harmless error exception by another name.
c. The Seventh Circuit'sMcGrath Rule
In Firemen's Insurance and Cross, the Seventh Circuit
had created a rule whereby the court could uphold a multi-claim
general verdict if there was a valid basis for one of the claims
based on its reading of the Wilmington decision. 3 ° In a
subsequent case, the circuit seemed to back off of this position
in favor of the Baldwin principle.' Yet, in 1981, the Seventh
Circuit decided to go in a completely different direction. In
McGrath v. Zenith Radio Corp.,32 the court devised a rule
whereby a defendant challenging a multi-claim general verdict
on appeal could triumph only if he could show that the plaintiff
could not prevail under any of the theories of liability.'33 The
purported rationale offered by the court was that it would be
mere "speculation" to assume that the invalid theory was the

129. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit itself seems to have folded the First Circuit's subset
theory within the framework of the Traver rule's factual similarities factor. Consider
Bender v. Wholesale & Retail FoodDist., Teamsters Local 63, No. CV-86-1072-JSL, 1991
WL 276452, at **2 (9th Cir. 1991) (affirming general verdict where "not only was the
evidence against Local 63 sufficient to support an award for Brown on his state law claims,
but these causes of action are also subsets of liability under the [faulty Labor Management
Reporting & Disclosure Act] claim"); Kern, 899 F.2d at 778 (exercising discretion under
Traver rule where proper claim of breach of contract was possible subset of age
discrimination claim, which required additional evidence as to motive); Traver, 627 F.2d at
939 (exercising discretion where § 1983 claims are "all but derivative" of the alleged state
torts and their corresponding facts and a "jury finding on a section 1983 claim would
necessarily encompass a finding of liability on one or more of the state law claims").
130. See Part 11,supra.
131. See Lawndale Natl. Bank v. Am. Cas. Co., 489 F.2d 1384, 1388-89 (7th Cir. 1973)
(applying the Baldwin rule to insurance dispute where "it is impossible to determine from
the general verdict upon which defense-arson or misrepresentation-the jury relied in
making its general verdict") (citing Baldwin).
132. 651 F.2d 458 (7th Cir. 1981).
133. Id. at 464 ("The case was submitted to the jury on three theories of liabilitybreach of contract, common law fraud, and violation of the securities laws-but the verdict
in favor of plaintiff did not specify under which theory or theories liability for
compensatory damages was imposed. Accordingly, to triumph on appeal, defendants must
show that under none of the three rationales was plaintiff entitled to the award of
compensatory and punitive damages.").
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basis of the jury's decision.'34 The McGrath decision thus turned
the Baldwin principle on its head. Baldwin held that where one
theory of liability is improper, but is cloaked in the guise of a
general verdict, the appellate court must reverse because it
cannot know that the jury did not base its decision on the invalid
ground. The McGrath rule, in contrast, states that an appellate
court must uphold the verdict because there is no way to know
that the verdict was not based on the valid ground. For this
reason, Judge Kozinski is sharply critical of the McGrath rule:
"The Seventh Circuit, for reasons of its own, has adopted a
maverick rule precisely the opposite of that repeatedly
announced by the Supreme Court. ... For reasons explained in

Baldwin, this rules makes no sense at all, never mind that it
contravenes Supreme Court authority."' 35 Indeed, in McGrath,
the Seventh Circuit never even mentions any of the Supreme
Court's decisions on point nor, for that matter, any of its own
previous decisions waffling between the Baldwin rule and the
harmless error exception. It is truly a maverick rule.
B. The Choice-of-Law Issue
In the modem era, the conflict between state "two issue"
rules and the Baldwin principle in federal cases based on
diversity jurisdiction has created a split in the circuits. The Sixth
Circuit has stuck with the rule it developed in the early years
whereby state law governs when the case is tried under state law
and the Baldwin principle governs when a case is tried under
federal law, such as a civil rights or antitrust case.'36 The

Eleventh Circuit has jumped into the fray as well only to issue

134. Id. at 472 ("Even if we assume arguendo that the instruction relating to the
securities violation was erroneous it cannot be shown, other than on the basis of speculation

or conjecture, to have affected the jury's decision, there being a totally adequate
independent theory upon which the verdict may have rested.").
135. See Kern, 899 F.2d at 790-91 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
136. The Sixth Circuit has consistently applied the Baldwin principle in cases arising
under federal law. See Arthur Langenderfer,Inc. v. S.E. Johnson Co.,729 F.2d 1050, 1058
(6th Cir. 1982); Doherty v. Am. Motors Corp., 728 F.2d 334, 344 (6th Cir. 1984);
Brandenburg v. Cureton, 882 F.2d 211, 214 (6th Cir. 1989); Virtual Maint., Inc. v. Prime
Computer, Inc., 957 F.2d 1318, 1326 (6th Cir. 1992); Virtual Maint., Inc. v. Prime
Computer, Inc., 11 F.3d 660, 667 (6th Cir. 1993).
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inconsistent decisions."' Yet, in perhaps a more surprising

development, the Ninth Circuit's Kern decision intimated in a
footnote that perhaps state law controlled its adoption of the
Traver rule. 3 s On the other hand, the Fourth Circuit and the Fifth
Circuit (to some degree) have both come down squarely on the
side of applying federal law, reasoning that appellate review of
general verdicts was a matter of procedure and not substance. 139
Noticeably absent in this debate is any direct discussion of the
Erie doctrine.
C. Waiver
A number of modem appellate courts have held that an
appellant is required to object to a general verdict before he can
invoke the Baldwin principle on appeal. The opinions follow a
predictable path. Typically, they will express some frustration at40
the district court's failure to employ a specialized verdict,
137. Compare Royal Typewriter, 719 F.2d at 1098-99 ("In diversity cases in this circuit,
an appellate court applies the federal, rather than the state, standard in reviewing challenges
to a general verdict"), with Michigan Abrasive Co., 805 F.2d at 1005 ("Since the jury
returned a general verdict, Alabama law requires that this court affirm both of the theories
presented to the jury in order to sustain its verdict.").
138. See Kern, 899 F.2d at 777 n. 2 (9th Cir. 1990) ("[Judge Kozinski's] dissent attacks
the Traver decision as contrary to century-old Supreme Court authority. We disagree, but
even if true it is not for this panel to decide. The dissent would have us overturn not only
decisions of the Supreme Court of Californiabut of our own court as well. We decline the
invitation.") (emphasis added). See also Niles v. U.S., 520 F. Supp. 808, 811-12 (N.D. Cal.
1981), aff'd, 710 F.2d 1391 (9th Cir. 1983) (treating the evaluation and review of general
verdicts as a question of state law in diversity cases).
139. In the Fourth Circuit, see Barber v. Whirlpool Corp., 34 F.3d 1268, 1278 (4th Cir.
1994) (refusing to apply state "two issue" rule and accompanying waiver provision
because "federal law controls verdicts") and Flowers v. Tandy Corp., 773 F.2d 585, 591
(4th Cir. 1985) ("Without regard to what state law may provide in such circumstances, a
question we do not decide, federal procedural law controls on this point."). The Fifth
Circuit cases include King. See 597 F.2d at 439 ("In diversity cases in this circuit, a district
court applies the federal, rather than the state, standard for determining whether a party's
evidence is sufficient to defeat a motion for a directed verdict or judgment n.o.v."). It is
also worth pointing out that the Federal Circuit has a distinction similar to the Erie doctrine
whereby it applies the law of the originating circuit to procedural issues, and in Embrex,
Inc. v. Service Engineering Corp, 216 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2000), it held that
"[preservation of appeal rights is a procedural issue." Id. at 1350.
140. Some courts seem to go even further to suggest that the use of a general verdict,
despite Rule 49(a)'s discretionary nature, may be per se error in certain situations. See
Nowell, 792 F.2d at 1312 n. I (suggesting that "the use of a general verdict to probe
disparate allegations of negligence and contributory negligence, if properly objected to,
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recognize that Rule 49(a) commits the decision on verdict form
to the district court's discretion, and finally suggest greater use
of the specialized verdict, often citing to an article by former
Chief Judge Brown of the Fifth Circuit.

41

Since they are

powerless to force the district court to adopt a specialized
verdict, they shift the burden to the appellant to properly object
to the use of the general verdict so as to put the district court on
notice and thereby preserve the applicability of the Baldwin
principle on appeal.
The Ninth Circuit seems to have the most established
waiver rule. In McCord v. McGuire, 42 Judge Kozinski held that
a request for a specialized verdict and a proper objection, if
refused, is necessary to preserve the Baldwin principle on
appeal:
Maguire's failure to request a special verdict as to each
factual theory in the case prevents him from pressing [the
Baldwin] argument on appeal. [While] Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 49(a) gives district courts wide discretion
in the use of special verdicts ... litigants have the

responsibility to request or submit special verdict forms.
Litigants like Maguire who wish to challenge the
sufficiency of the evidence as to some, but not all,
specifications of negligence must present an appropriate
record for review by asking the jury to make separate
factual determinations as to each specification. Any other
rule would unnecessarily jeopardize jury verdicts that are
otherwise fully supported by the record on the mere
theoretical possibility that the jury based its decision on
unsupported specifications. We will not allow litigants to
play procedural brinkmanship with the jury system and take
43
advantage of uncertainties they could well have avoided.1

would in all likelihood meet with our decisive disapproval"). But see Mueller, 573 F.2d at

1038 n. 13 (8th Cir. 1978) ("We do not hold that the trial court's refusal to submit the
special verdict here was an abuse of discretion, much less that such refusal constituted
reversible error. But we do suggest that cases such as this, where multiple theories of

liability are asserted, are the ones most suited to the use of special verdicts, because special
verdicts will often obviate the necessity of deciding difficult legal questions which are not
essential to an appropriate disposition of the controversy.").
141. See Brown, supra n. 21, at 338-39.
142. 873 F.2d 1271 (9th Cir. 1989).
143. Id. at 1274.
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Judge Kozinski's move may be quite clever. All can agree
that judicial economy is harmed by the Baldwin rule, and that
the Traver rule and the harmless error doctrine are attempts to
mitigate the harsh effect of the Baldwin principle. Yet, the same
result may be obtained if the appellate court is never placed in
the position of having to apply the Baldwin principle in the first
place. Although an appellate court cannot force a district court to
employ a specialized verdict, it can force the litigant to bring it
to the court's attention, which may place the necessary pressure
on the court to craft the verdicts specially. Judge Kozinski's
waiver rule thus remains faithful to the Baldwin principle as
precedent while at the same time doing the work of the harmless
error doctrine with respect to economizing on scarce judicial
resources without engaging in judicial telepathy. It should
therefore not be surprising that other circuits have toyed with
this approach. 14
IV. THE VITALITY OF THE BALDWIN PRINCIPLE IN THE MODERN
ERA

At its most abstract level, the modem debate in the circuit
courts between the Baldwin principle and a discretionary
harmless error rule is focused on the weight and scope of
Supreme Court precedent versus a perceived statutory
command. In recent years, the debate has become a prize fight,
with Judges Kozinski and Cowen in one corner arguing for
adherence to Supreme Court precedents; and Judges Barrett and
Cardamone, Chief Judge Becker and then-Judge Kennedy in the
other distinguishing the precedents and pointing to the statutory
provisions to buttress their position. No one knows who the
ultimate winner in this battle will be. Indeed, the Supreme Court
likely will have to step in at some point and resolve the issue.
144. See e.g. Anixter, 77 F.3d at 1231-32; Henderson, 1995 WL 378602 at **5; Pan E.,
855 F.2d at 1124; O'Neill, 839 F.2d at 12. But see Richards v. Michelin Tire Co., 21 F.3d

1048, 1056 n. 15 (11th Cir. 1994) ("Richards contends that because Appellant did not
object to the special verdict forms, it waived its right to appeal. Alternatively, he argues
that the failure to object authorizes this Court to sustain the verdict based on either claim.
We reject these assertions. The failure to object to a proposed verdict format does not
waive the right to object to the sufficiency of the evidence. . . . [I]t was the court's
responsibility to ensure that the interrogatories were not deficient; i.e., to guarantee that
they differentiated between the design and warning claims.") (citations omitted).
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For present purposes, however, the purpose of this article is to
ascertain who has a better case on the merits as the law stands
right now.141
The first line of analysis is the authority, strength, and
scope of the Supreme Court's Baldwin line of cases. There are
two possible interpretations. One interpretation, the "absolute"
interpretation endorsed by Judges Kozinski and Cowen, is that
the Supreme Court has affirmatively held that because it is
impossible to ascertain the basis for a jury's general verdict
when one of the claims is invalid, the case must be remanded for
retrial. In Sunkist Growers, for example, the Court seemed to
embrace this absolute view; 146 it did not intimate (or even inquire
into) whether it was possible that the jury verdict could have
rested on the valid claim, but rather merely cited Baldwin to
suggest that it was "unnecessary for us to explore the legality of
the other theories."' 47 Nowhere did the court inquire into
whether the jury's general verdict was premised on the valid
claim. It only cited Baldwin. The second interpretation, which
we might call the "conditional" interpretation, is that the
Baldwin line of cases applies only if it is impossible to say upon
which claim the general verdict rested. Recall Judge Barrett's
assertion in Asbill that the Baldwin line of cases does "not paint
with as broad a brush as appears" 148 and the Fifth Circuit's
citation to Wilmington for this proposition in the American
Airlines case. 149 In Wilmington, the Court's position may perhaps
have suggested a conditional approach in the following passage:
[W]here a jury is wrongfully permitted ... to take into

consideration in reaching a verdict counts of a declaration
which have not been supported by any evidence, and where
it is impossible from the record to say upon which of the
counts of the declaration the verdict was based, the
145. I am aware of only one other extended article on this subject, see Elizabeth Cain
Moore, Note, General Verdicts in Multi-Claim Litigation, 21 Mem. St. U. L. Rev. 705

(1991), but it does not take a position on the merits of the arguments advanced on each
side.
146. Sunkist Growers, 370 U.S. at 30.
147. Id.at 29-30 ("Since we hold erroneous one theory of liability upon which the
general verdict may have rested ... it is unnecessary for us to explore the legality of the
other theories") (citing Baldwin).
148. Asbill, 726 F.2d at 1504.
149. Am. Airlines, 418 F.2d at 195.
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judgment entered under such circumstances can [not] be
sustained upon the theory that substantial rights of the
objecting party had not been invaded."O
The conditional inference is a negative one deriving from
the highlighted language. The Court's use of the "where it is
impossible" language suggests that it may not be possible in
certain cases to ascertain the basis for a general verdict. It is also
at least plausible to infer from Baldwin and Halecki a similar
conditional rule.5 ' But to say a particular interpretation is
plausible is not to say that it is persuasive. It is true that the
Baldwin line of cases could be read either way. But the question
is which interpretation conforms more closely to the feel of
these cases and the Supreme Court's intent. The answer, I
believe, is that the Baldwin principle is absolute. In each case in
which the Court has discussed the issue, the Baldwin rule has
appeared to be automatic. The Court has never even hinted at the
possibility of harmless error nor has it ever found that it could
somehow divine the basis for a multi-faceted general verdict.'52
Neither Judge Barrett nor the Fifth Circuit can point to any case
to this effect. We should not, then, read too much into negative
inferences, especially when they are such a sharp departure from
the traditional rule. If the Court intended such a drastically
different rule than the one presumed in the early years, one
would naturally expect that the Court would have been more
explicit about it. Pregnant inferences from casual language are
not a sound analysis of precedent. Thus, in the absence of a
clearer statement from the Court, the absolute interpretation of
the Baldwin principle should control. It should thus have a
binding effect on the lower federal courts-an effect that those
circuits employing discretionary rules, and most certainly the
Seventh Circuit's McGrath rule, are refusing to recognize.
150. Wilmington, 205 U.S. at 79 (emphasis added).
151. Halecki, 358 U.S. at 619 ("for there is no way to know that the invalid claim of
unseaworthiness was not the sole basis for the verdict"); Baldwin, 112 U.S. at 493 ("but its

generality prevents us from perceiving upon which plea they found").
152. See Axelrad & Kraus, supra n. 109, at 43 (pointing out that the Baldwin principle

"derives from an undeniably sound rationale-that a reviewing court can never confidently
know either the basis for a general verdict or whether inclusion of an erroneous theory
prejudiced the jury's deliberations. Nothing in the record can illuminate this inquiry, or
render it more than pure guesswork. The Supreme Court has reaffirmed its general verdict
rule three times, without question or qualification.").
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The modem circuit courts have attempted to circumvent
the absolute interpretation of the Baldwin line of cases by
pointing to various external sources. Recall Judge Barrett's
citation to Rule 61 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in
Asbill.'53 The caption above Rule 61 is entitled "harmless error,"
and it reads as follows:
No error in either the admission or the exclusion of
evidence and no error or defect in any ruling or order or in
anything done or omitted by the court or by any of the
parties is ground for granting a new trial or for setting aside
a verdict or for vacating, modifying, or otherwise disturbing
a judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action
appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice.
The court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard
any error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect
the substantial rights of the parties.'19
Rule 61 thus raises a difficult interpretive question.
Although the drafters of Rule 61 clearly set out to economize
judicial resources by instructing courts to ignore harmless errors,
it is entirely possible to read the Baldwin line of cases as a
considered judgment that when a jury returns a general verdict
premised on multiple claims, one of which is invalid, the
"substantial rights of the parties" would be affected per se if the
court ascribed the verdict to the valid claim. If so, then there is
no conflict between the Baldwin line of cases and Rule 61's
procedural mandate. The rule simply speaks to other more
technical errors that do not invade the "substantial rights" of the
parties.
Alternatively, Rule 61 could be read as conflicting
directly with the absolute interpretation of the Baldwin line of
cases if one were to interpret the rule as contemplating a caseby-case inquiry into harmless error. Because Congress has
ratified Rule 61 it should trump. Rule 61 was enacted in 1937,
well after Baldwin and Wilmington, but earlier than Halecki and
Sunkist Growers. On this theory, Rule 61 abrogated the former
decisions; thus, the Court simply made a mistake in Halecki and
Sunkist Growers by blindly adhering to an absolute
interpretation of the earlier precedents without taking into
153. Asbill, 726 F.2d at 1504.
154. Fed. R. Civ. P. 61.
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account a rule that was enacted after they were decided. Yet, it
was the Supreme Court that promulgated the rules of civil
procedure, and it seems odd to suggest that it was unaware of its
own rules. Moreover, it is important to recognize that the
language of Rule 61 mirrors the language of the Wilmington
decision,'55 and if I am correct in reading Wilmington as absolute
in light of Halecki and Sunkist Growers's treatment of it as such,
then it also must be the case that the absolute interpretation of
the Baldwin principle fits squarely within Rule 61.
An argument could be made that reliance on Rule 61 to
sidestep the Baldwin line of cases is misplaced because Rule 61
does not apply to appellate courts. As Rule 1 makes clear, the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply only to the district
courts."' In McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v.
Greenwood,'57 however, the Court noted that "while in a narrow
sense Rule 61 applies only to the district courts, see Fed. Rule
Civ. Proc. 1, it is well-settled that the appellate courts should act
in accordance with the salutary policy embodied in Rule 61." 158
The Court itself thus suggested that the policies underlying Rule
61 should be applicable to appellate review. In McDonough, the
Court went on to note that "Congress has further reinforced the
application of Rule 61 by enacting the harmless error statute, 28
U.S.C. § 2111, which applies directly to appellate courts and
which incorporates the same principle as that found in Rule
61." ' In Asbill, Judge Barrett had cited this provision in
conjunction with Rule 61 to justify using harmless error
analysis.' 60 Section 2111 is also entitled "harmless error" and
provides:
On the hearing of any appeal or writ of certiorari in any
case, the court shall give judgment after an examination of

155. Wilmington, 205 U.S. at 79.
156. Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 ("These rules govern the procedure in the United States district
courts in all suits of a civil nature whether cognizable as cases at law or in equity or in
admiralty, with the exceptions stated in Rule 81.") (emphasis added). Rule 61's harmless
error rule thus only applies to post-judgment motions for new trial and things of that sort.
157. 464 U.S. 548 (1984).

158. Id. at 554.
159. Id.
160. Asbill, 726 F.2d at 1504.
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the record without regard to errors or defects which do not
affect the substantial rights of the parties."'
Even if, then, Rule 61 did not apply to appellate courts,
Section 2111 would. Yet, Section 2111 uses the same
"substantial rights" language that both Wilmington and Rule 61
employed, and if the analysis above is correct, the same result
should obtain here. The Baldwin principle, read in light of
Halecki and Sunkist Growers, would suggest that if an appellate
court were to ascribe a jury's general verdict to a valid claim
where another was improper, the substantial rights of the parties
would be affected per se. Thus, external sources do not justify a
departure from the Baldwin principle.
An alternative avenue of escaping the Baldwin principle is
based on the Court's criminal rule. The circuit courts, however,
have read the criminal rule in conflicting ways. In Bruneau,
Judge Cardamone's opinion for the Second Circuit relied on
Kotteakos v. U.S. as authority for harmless error analysis; 62
however, the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Neubauer relied on the
Court's decision in Stromberg v. Californiato affirm the vitality
of the Baldwin principle."' Who is right? The disentanglement
of the Court's criminal harmless error rule is not easy, and a
thorough analysis of it is beyond the scope of this article. But as
a precedential matter, we can analyze the viability of relying on
these decisions to justify either harmless error or the Baldwin
principle.
In Kotteakos,164 a large group of people was charged with
a single conspiracy to defraud various credit institutions and the
Federal Housing Administration. A jury returned a verdict
against all the defendants, but on appeal, the circuit court held
that there was not a single conspiracy engaged in by all the
defendants, but rather separate and distinct conspiracies as a
matter of law.'65 The basic defect in the single conspiracy charge
was that one defendant ran the operation. The other defendants,

161.
162.
163.
164.

28 U.S.C. § 2111.
Bruneau, 163 F.3d at 760.
Neubauer, 766 F.2d at 1575-76.
328 U.S. 750 (1946).

165. Id. at 755-56 (quoting the circuit court as holding that the trial judge "was plainly
wrong in supposing that upon the evidence there could be a single conspiracy; and in the
view he took of the law, he should have dismissed the indictment").
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without knowledge of each other, each individually acted
through him; therefore, a single conspiracy could not be proven.
The circuit court, however, relying on a predecessor to 28
U.S.C. § 2111, had refused to overturn the convictions on the
ground that the error was not prejudicial and thus harmless. The
Court reversed. The substantial right of the parties that was
invaded, according to the Court, was "the right not to be tried en
masse for the conglomeration of distinct and se arate offenses
committed by others as shown by this record." IF, It is curious,
then, that Judge Cardamone relied on a case that actually
reversed and refused to find harmless error to justify such a
sharp departure from otherwise controlling Supreme Court
precedent.
But there are deeper problems with Judge Cardamone's
reliance on Kotteakos. First, the scenario is analytically different
from the Baldwin line of cases. It does not involve a general
verdict encompassing multiple theories of liability, one of which
is invalid; rather, it involves a situation in which one theory of
liability is promulgated, and is itself invalid. In Kotteakos, an
appellate court could not construe the verdict to be anything
else. Thus, it simply does not speak to the Baldwin principle.
Second, Judge Cardamone's opinion fails to recognize that the
Kotteakos Court had noted that the predecessor statute to 28
U.S.C. § 2111 was primarily concerned with criminal cases:
[A]nyone familiar with it knows that [the predecessor
statute] grew out of widespread and deep conviction over
the general course of appellate review in American criminal
causes. This was shortly, as one trial judge put it after [the
predecessor statute] had become law, that courts of review,
"tower above the trials of criminal cases as impregnable
citadels of technicality." So great was the threat of reversal,
in many jurisdictions, that criminal trial became a game for
sowing reversible error in the record, only to have repeated
the same matching
of wits when a new trial had been thus
67
obtained.1

166. Id. at 775.
167. Id. at 759. See generally Charles Alan Wright, Federal Practice & Procedure

Criminal vol. 3A, § 852 (2d ed., West 1982) ("There was a time when appellate courts, in
criminal cases especially, were 'impregnable citadels of technicality"') (emphasis added).
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The Wilmington Court's recognition that criminal cases
are somehow different taps into this history of concern with
technicalities in the criminal context.'68 The legal system has
historically viewed a technicality that allows a murderer or rapist
to walk out of the courtroom much differently than a technicality
that allows a negligent driver to do the same, and consequently,
the federal harmless error statute is primarily intended to address
the former situation. Moreover, even if there were a similar
concern with technicalities in the civil context, it does not follow
that the Baldwin principle needs to be abrogated as a result. The
Baldwin principle is not based on a technicality, but instead on
the inability of an appellate court to ascertain whether a jury
based its general verdict on a proper or improper claim. It is one
thing to say that an evidentiary mistake is harmless; it is quite
another to say that a general verdict containing an invalid theory
of liability is harmless where the court has no way of knowing
on what the jury based its verdict. There is a difference between
judicial prognostication as to what effect an error may have had
on a jury and judicial telepathy as to what the jury actually
decided.
Judge Cardamone's attempt to tap into Kotteakos and the
criminal cases to support a harmless error rule was unwise, But
what about the Fifth Circuit's attempt to tap into the same genus
of cases to justify the Baldwin principle? The Fifth Circuit, as
noted above, relied on Stromberg to buttress its application of
the Baldwin principle. In Stromberg v. California,69 Yetta
Stromberg had been convicted of violating a California criminal
syndicalism statute prohibiting the display of a red flag (1) as an
emblem of opposition to the organized government; or (2) as an
invitation to anarchistic action; or (3) as an aid to propaganda of
a seditious nature. On appeal, the Court found the first clause of
the statute to be repugnant to the Constitution on its face. For
our purposes, though, the crucial passage related to the
disposition of the case:
The verdict against the appellant was a general one. It did
not specify the ground upon which it rested. As there were
168. See Wilmington, 205 U.S. at 78 ("And, of course, in a [civil] case like the one we
are considering we cannot maintain the verdict, as might be done in a criminal case upon a
general verdict of guilty upon all the counts of an indictment.") (emphasis added).
169. 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
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three purposes set forth in the statute, and the jury was
instructed that their verdict might be given with respect to
any one of them, independently considered, it is impossible
to say under which clause of the statute the conviction was
obtained. If any one of these clauses ... was invalid, it
cannot be determined upon this record that the appellant
was not convicted under that clause. It may be added that
this is far from being a merely academic proposition, as it
appears, upon an examination of the original record filed
with this Court, that the State's attorney upon the trial
emphatically urged upon the jury that they could convict
the appellant under the first clause alone, without regard to
the other clauses. It follows that ... the necessary
conclusion from the manner in which the case was sent to
the jury is that, if any of the clauses in question is invalid
under the Federal Constitution, the conviction cannot be
upheld.17 °
On its face, it would seem that the disposition of the
Stromberg case is fully in accord with the Baldwin principle, and
the Fifth Circuit was thereby correct to rely upon it. It is
important to note, however, that Stromberg, like the Baldwin
line of cases, may be susceptible to an absolute interpretation or
a conditional interpretation focusing on the "if any of the
clauses in question is invalid under the Federal Constitution"
language. In subsequent cases, the Court, unlike in the Baldwin
context, made clear that the conditional interpretation is actually
the correct one. In the most recent analysis of the Stromberg line
of cases, Griffin v. U.S., ' the Court stated:
[T]he holding of Stromberg do[es] not necessarily stand for
anything more than the principle that, where a provision of
the Constitution forbids conviction on a particular ground,
the constitutional guarantee is violated by a general verdict
that may have rested on that ground.
Petitioner cites no case, and we are aware of none, in which
we have set aside a general verdict because one of the
possible bases of conviction was neither unconstitutional as

170. Id. at 367-368. See also Williams v. N.C., 317 U.S. 287 (1942); Cramer v. U.S., 325
U.S. 1 (1945); Yates v. U.S., 354 U.S. 298, 311-12 (1957).
171. 502 U.S. 46(1991).
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in Stromberg, nor even illegal as in Yates, but merely
unsupported by sufficient evidence. 72
The Stromberg line of criminal cases, therefore, only
applies where the invalid ground is constitutionally defective
and it is possible that the jury rested its general verdict on that
ground. Although the essence of the Baldwin principle is
somewhat manifest in these circumstances, it is clear that the
Stromberg line of cases is much narrower.'73 Thus, the Fifth
Circuit's reliance on these cases in Neubaueris misplaced.
A final point of discussion is the choice-of-law question. I
have argued above that 28 U.S.C. § 2111, read in light of the
Court's precedents, incorporates the Baldwin principle. It is (or
at least should be) the law of the federal appellate courts. Almost
all of the states, however, have enacted "two issue" rules that
essentially make the Baldwin scenario subject to a discretionary
harmless error analysis. There is often a conflict between these
two rules in appellate cases, and there is a split in resolving the
conflict among the circuit courts. As noted in Parts III and IV,
the Sixth Circuit has consistently applied a rule whereby a state
"two issue" rule governs when a case is tried under state law
and the Baldwin principle applies when the case is tried under
federal law. On the other hand, the Fourth Circuit has come
down squarely on the side of federal law, determining that
appellate review of general verdicts is a matter of procedure not
substance. 174 How should this conflict be resolved?
In Wilmington, the Court had suggested that state law
might be applicable by distinguishing an Illinois statute on

172. Id. at 53-56.
173. There is a broader question here as to whether a constitutional error can ever be
considered harmless. See generally Yale Kamisar, Wayne R. LaFave, Jerold H. Israel &
Nancy King, Modern Criminal Procedure: Cases-Comments-Questions 1589-1612 (9th ed.
West 1999). See also William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Harmless Error,30 J. Leg.
Stud. 161 (Jan. 2001); Charles F. Campbell, Jr., An Economic View of Developments in -the
Harmless Error and Exclusionary Rules, 42 Baylor L. Rev. 499 (Summer 1990). That
debate, however, is beyond the scope of this paper.
174. As will be explained infra, the substance-procedure dichotomy is not entirely
relevant to this debate because the Supremacy Clause renders 28 U.S.C. § 2111 controlling.
For a useful discussion of the substance-procedure dichotomy, however, see Paul D.
Carrington, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the Rules Enabling Act, 1989 Duke L. J.
281; Stephen B. Burbank, Comment, Hold the Corks: A Comment on Paul Carrington's
"Substance" and "Procedure" in the Rules EnablingAct, 1989 Duke L.J. 1012.
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point.'75 Yet, it is hard to know what to make of this suggestion.
The Wilmington decision came down in 1907, twenty-one years
prior to the creation of the Erie doctrine and far removed from
its modem development. We should be careful then not to place
too much emphasis on Wilmington's discussion of state law. It
may be a product of the era when the application of state and
federal law was not as clearly demarcated.
The Erie doctrine is thus the proper place to begin the
inquiry. As an initial matter, it should be pointed out that there is
now no question that the Baldwin principle applies in cases
based on federal law. Federal courts apply federal procedural
76
law. On this point, the Sixth and Fourth Circuits seem to agree.1
The real source of contention between these two circuits is the
rule to be applied in diversity cases. In the early years, the
conflict between federal and state law was a conflict between a
state statute-such as the Illinois "two issue" statute-and a
federal common law rule embodied in the Baldwin principle.
However, with the enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 2111 in 1949, the
conflict has changed to a conflict between a state statute and a
federal statute with a Baldwin gloss. The difference is crucial
because federal statutes bring the Supremacy Clause into play. In
Stewart Organization,Inc. v. Ricoh Corp.,' the Court held that
a federal statute that is "sufficiently broad" to control the
conflict should control by virtue of the Supremacy Clause.
Section 2111 is in direct conflict with the state "two issue"
rules. At some level, of course, the state "two issue" rules and
28 U.S.C. § 2111 are essentially similar efforts to proscribe
harmless error analysis. But 28 U.S.C. § 2111 exempts errors
that affect the "substantial rights" of the parties, and the
Baldwin line of cases has interpreted this language where a
general verdict encompassing multiple theories of liability is
returned. The interpretation is based on the statute itself, and so
175. See Wilmington, 205 U.S. at 78-79 ("Nor does § 57 of the Illinois Practice Act...
support the contention that errors of the character of those we have just been considering

must be treated as not prejudicial. . . . This section has been held not to relate to counts
which are vitally defective, but as only providing that where a declaration consists of

several counts, and some of the counts contain defects not vital ... a party cannot wait until
after the close of the evidence at the trial, and, afortiori,after verdict, and then for the first
time question the sufficiency of the counts.") (citing Illinois cases).
176. See supra nn. 136 & 139 and accompanying text.
177. 487 U.S. 22 (1988).
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does not mitigate the Supremacy Clause's force in displacing
state law. The Sixth Circuit's rule, therefore, must be rejected. In
addition, because Section 2111 is a procedural rule, the second
prong of the Stewart test is satisfied:" 'Erie and its offspring cast
no doubt on the long-recognized power of Congress to prescribe
housekeeping rules for federal courts."' 178
V. A

POLICY-BASED DEFENSE OF THE BALDWIN PRINCIPLE

In the preceding section, I argued, as a matter of law, that
the Baldwin principle remains alive and well and that courts
invoking harmless error analysis flout standing Supreme Court
precedent. In contrast, this section endeavors to mount a policybased defense of the Baldwin principle.
As a preliminary matter, it is important to recognize that
the federal courts have a longstanding policy of requiring
unanimous jury verdicts. 7 9 Indeed, in Apodaca v. Oregon,8 "
Justice White wrote that the requirement arose during the
Middle Ages. 8' Moreover, in Johnson v. Louisiana, s2 Justice
Powell elaborated on its common law pedigree:
In an unbroken line of cases reaching back into the late
1800's, the Justices of this Court have recognized, virtually
without dissent, that unanimity is one of the indispensable
features of federal jury trial. In these cases, the Court has
presumed that unanimous verdicts are essential in federal
178. Id. at 32 (citing Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 473 (1965)).
179. See Jeffrey Abramson, We, The Jury: The Jury System and the Ideal of Democracy

179 (Basic Books 1994). See also Jeremy Osher, Note and Comment, Jury Unanimity in
California:Should It Stay or Should It Go?, 29 Loy. L.A.L. Rev. 1319 (1996).

180. 406 U.S. 404 (1972).
181. Id. at 407. Justice White posited four possible theories for the birth of the unanimity
requirement. One theory is that the rule was designed to compensate for the lack of
procedural safeguards ensuring that the defendant received a fair trial. A second theory is
that the rule developed from the practice of afforcement of the jury that was firmly
established by the late fourteenth century. This term merely meant that a sufficient number
were to be added to the panel until twelve were at last found to agree in the same
conclusion. Third, it is possible that unanimity developed "because early juries, unlike
juries today, personally had knowledge of the facts of a case; the medieval mind assumed
there could be only one correct view of the facts, and, if either all the jurors or only a
minority thereof declared the facts erroneously, they might be punished for perjury."
Finally, unanimity may have arisen out of the medieval concept of consent which carried
with it the idea of unanimity. Id. at n. 2.
182. 406 U.S. 356 (1972).
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jury trials, not because unanimity is necessarily
fundamental to the function performed by the jury, but
because that result is mandated by history. . . . [T]he
framers desired to preserve the jury safeguard as it was
known to them at common law. At the time the Bill of
Rights was adopted, unanimity had long been established as
one of the attributes of a jury conviction at common law.'83

It is thought that a unanimous verdict is desirable for
several reasons, but most prominently because it is believed to
encourage robust jury deliberation and ensure a more accurate
outcome.184 Although the Court has flirted with non-unanimity in
criminal cases,'85 and legal scholars have occasionally argued for
a non-unanimity rule,8 6 the rule that jury verdicts must be
unanimous in civil cases is still the prevailing federal law
87 The 1991 amendments to Rule 48 expressly provided
today.'
183. Id. at 369 (Powell, J., concurring) (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
184. See Richard A. Primus, When Democracy is Not Self-Government: Toward a
Defense of the Unanimity Rule for Criminal Juries, 18 Cardozo L. Rev. 1417 (1997). See
also James Wm.Moore, Moore's Federal Practicevol. 9, § 48.05[l]-[4] (3d ed., Matthew
Bender 2001) ("Unanimity provides greater certainty in the result and reinforces each
juror's agreement with the verdict. In short, unanimity protects the parties and the jury.");
Edward P. Schwartz & Warren F. Schwartz, Decisionmaking by Juries Under Unanimity
and Supermajority Voting Rules, 80 Geo. L.J. 775 (1992).
185. See Apodaca v. Ore., 406 U.S. 404 (1972); Johnson v. La., 406 U.S. 356 (1972).
Although Justice Powell's opinion advocating a constitutional unanimity rule was
controlling in Johnson, it should be noted that a unanimous verdict rule was rejected by a
plurality in Apodaca. See Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 406. Both of these cases, however, were
criminal, and it should be further noted that, prior to the Apodaca plurality's decision, there
was a long line of Court precedents that advocated unanimous verdicts. See Am.Publg. Co.
v. Fischer, 166 U.S. 464 (1897); Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343 (1898); Patton v. U.S.,
281 U.S. 276 (1930); Andres v. U.S., 333 U.S. 740 (1948). The criminal jury verdict rule,
however, is premised on the Sixth Amendment, whereas the civil jury verdict rule is
premised on the Seventh Amendment, and the distinction may make a difference. See
Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, FederalPractice & ProcedureCivil 2d, vol. 9A
§ 2492 (2d ed. West 1995) (arguing that "[t]he language of the Sixth Amendment differs
from that of the Seventh Amendment" such that these decisions are inapplicable in the civil
context).
186. In recent years, many commentators have begun to criticize the unanimity
requirement. See e.g. Jere W. Morehead, A "Modest" Proposal for Jury Reform: The
Elimination of Required Unanimous Verdicts, 46 U. Kan. L. Rev. 933 (1998); Michael H.
Glasser, Comment, Letting the Supermajority Rule: Non-unanimous Jury Verdicts in
Criminal Trials, 24 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 659 (1997); James Kachmar, Comment, Silencing
the Minority: Permitting Non-unanimous Jury Verdicts in Criminal Trials, 28 Pac. L. J.
273 (1996).
187. See Wright & Miller, supra n. 185, at § 2492 ("In the absence of a stipulation,
however, the requirement of unanimity prevails in federal civil actions, and courts have

THE BALDWIN PRINCIPLE

that a verdict "shall be unanimous" unless the parties otherwise
stipulate,'88 and modem court cases have asserted that a
unanimity rule is pregnant in the language of the Seventh
Amendment.'89 It is therefore now clear that unanimity is
required in federal civil cases and is probably constitutionally
mandated.
The unanimity requirement is relevant to the debate
regarding whether the Baldwin principle or the harmless error
exception applies. The cases invoking a discretionary harmless
error exception quixotically attempt to ascertain the basis of the
jury's general verdict. If the court somehow believes that the
jury based its verdict on one of the valid remaining theories of
liability, it has shown some willingness to hold the error
harmless. The problem with this approach, however, is that it
often treats the jury as a monolithic body. It is not. It is a body
consisting of several members, and if only one member based
her decision on the invalid theory of liability, and the court
persists in viewing the error as harmless, the general verdict
could no longer be considered unanimous. It may have been
harmless error for eleven out of twelve jurors. However, if one
person based her decision on the invalid theory of liability, that
means that the error is not truly harmless because the jury would
not have returned the general verdict absent that one person. A
court, applying a discretionary harmless error exception, would
have thus allowed a general verdict that was not unanimous to
stand-a result that contravenes the unanimity requirement and
therefore is not harmless. Unless we are willing to tolerate an ex

gone to great lengths to insist that a verdict be in fact the verdict of a unanimous jury.");
see also Moore, supra n. 184, at § 48.05 [1]-[4] ("The verdict must be unanimous"). Prior
to 1991, there was some doubt as to whether there was a federal unanimity rule in civil
cases. Compare Wieser v. ChryslerMotors Corp., 69 F.R.D. 97 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (arguing
that there is no Seventh Amendment requirement of unanimity in a civil case) with Masino
v. Outboard Marine Corp., 652 F.2d 330 (3d Cir, 1981) (arguing that there is a federal
unanimity rule). However, with the 1991 amendments to Rule 48, the issue was resolved.
See Moore, supra n. 184, at § 48.05 [1]-[4] ("Prior to the 1991 revision of Rule 48, courts
disputed whether a federal jury verdict must be unanimous. . . . Revised Rule 48 resolves
that dispute by clarifying that 'the verdict shall be unanimous' unless the parties stipulate to
the contrary." ).
188. Fed. R. Civ. P. 48.
189. See Murray v. Laborers Union Local No. 324, 55 F.3d 1445, 1450-51 (9th Cir.

1995) ("The Seventh Amendment requires jury verdicts in federal civil cases to be
unanimous") (citing Justice Powell's Johnson concurrence, Andres, and Fisher).
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post abrogation of a strong federal policy, probably
constitutionally mandated,1 90 that has been around since the
Middle Ages, this error could not be characterized as harmless.
Once this is understood, it becomes clear that those courts
professing adherence to a harmless error exception grossly
overstate their ability to ascertain the basis for a jury's general
verdict. A court would have to be confident that not even one
juror based her decision on the invalid theory of liability. Apart
from the narrow case of subsets discussed in Part IV, it is simply
impossible to imagine a situation where an appellate court could
have such confidence, and it is dangerous for it to even think it
does. On what basis could it possibly make such a judgment?
Could it be anything other than judicial telepathy?
Presumably, those circuit courts advocating harmless
error analysis are attempting to mitigate the prospect of litigants
getting off on technicalities. This was the impetus for the
harmless error statute, and there are indications in a handful of
opinions that this is indeed the case. The unanimity rule,
however, has a built-in preference for false non-liability over
false liability in civil cases just as it has a built-in preference for
false acquittal over false conviction in criminal cases. 9 ' False
liability is generally regarded as a horrific result, and a
unanimous decision rule for juries endeavors to minimize its
occurrence, even if doing so raises the incidence of false nonliability. As Rae argues, the federal court system exhibits a
positional preference regarding outcomes, and the decision rule
(unanimity) is thus weighted to reflect that positional
preference.'92 Yet, if an appellate court were to affirm a general
verdict where only a single juror based her decision on an
invalid theory of liability, the positional preference for nonliability embodied in the unanimity rule would be turned on its
head. The appellate courts would be favoring false liability over
false non-liability. They would, in effect, be reversing the most

190. If the unanimity rule is constitutionally based, as the Ninth Circuit asserts, and I
believe to be true, then an appellate court can't abridge the Seventh Amendment any more
than a district court could-even if it wanted to.
191. See Primus, supra n. 184, at 1436.
192. See Douglas W. Rae, Decision-Rules and Individual Values in Constitutional
Choice, 63 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 40, 52-53 (1969). Rae's argument is made specifically in the
criminal context, but it applies to civil cases as well.
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basic principle of our legal system.
The dangers mentioned above are real, and an appellate
court should not underestimate them. Let us suppose, however,
that there is a legitimate concern with technicalities and that the
legal system is willing (and properly able) to tolerate some level
of error to compensate for it. If so, would an appellate court be
justified in applying harmless error analysis? Again, I think the
answer is no, at least not when there are less dangerous means of
obtaining the same result. The discretionary harmless error
exception is a blunt instrument, but alternative methods of
achieving the same result, such as Judge Kozinski's waiver
rule,'93 or a rule that makes the use of general verdicts in multiclaim scenarios reversible error,'94 could mitigate the potential

danger associated with harmless error analysis while addressing
the concern with technicalities. Both of these rules, I believe,
would be excellent salves. In addition, the appellate courts
routinely apply similar rules in a wide variety of contexts, so it is

not as if they would be breaking any new ground by instituting
such rules. Indeed, given the prevalence of per se abuse of
discretion and waiver rules in modern appellate practice, it

193. See McCord, 873 F.2d at 1274 (recognizing that a waiver rule would "not allow
litigants to play procedural brinkmanship with the jury system and take advantage of
uncertainties they could well have avoided"). See generally Part IlI.C, supra (discussing
the modem courts' reasoning with respect to a waiver rule).
194. The Fifth Circuit, as noted above, has intimated that the use of a general verdict for
multiple claims may be error in and of itself. See Nowell, 792 F.2d at 1312 n. I (suggesting
that "the use of a general verdict to probe disparate allegations of negligence and
contributory negligence, if properly objected to, would in all likelihood meet with our
decisive disapproval"). But see Mueller, 573 F.2d at 1038 n. 13 (emphasizing discretionary
nature of specialized verdicts to reject a Nowell argument). Although a per se reversible
error rule would not change the outcome that the Baldwin principle requires in the
particular case, it is likely to deter district courts in the future from employing general
verdicts to probe disparate theories of liability. It therefore would have the desirable effect
of avoiding the Baldwin scenario altogether. See Brown, supra n. 22 (encouraging the use
of special verdicts); but for another point of view, see David A. Lombardero, Do Special
Verdicts Improve the Structure of Jury Decision-Making? 36 Jurimetrics J. 275 (Spring
1996) (noting that special verdicts, depending on how they are structured, can be biased
toward the plaintiff and can lead to judicial inefficiency). Still, because special verdicts are
perceived as aiding judicial economy, it is perhaps unsurprising that many appellate courts
routinely encourage district courts to use special verdicts, even if they perceive themselves
to be powerless to force them to do so because of Rule 49(a). Yet, a reversible error per se
rule would not necessarily conflict with Rule 49(a). It could be based on the idea that the
use of a general verdict in Baldwin situations is an abuse of the discretion that Rule 49(a)
commits to the district court.
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seems odd that the appellate courts have not embraced such
rules already. Regardless, the point here is that these rules would
not present the same dangers as a discretionary harmless error
exception, and as a result, a more dangerous harmless error rule
cannot be justified as a policy matter.
VI. CONCLUSION.

The Baldwin principle enjoyed a brief period of
dominance in the early 1900s. In the last thirty years, however,
the circuit courts have attempted to conserve on judicial
resources, and as a result, they have endeavored to find a
plausible reason for distinguishing the Baldwin line of cases. In
this article, I suggest that the circuit courts have been acting
lawlessly. The reasons they offer for distinguishing the Baldwin
line of cases do not stand up upon close scrutiny. The Baldwin
line of cases is an automatic rule requiring vacatur of the
judgment, a remand of the case, and a new trial order. The Court
has never backed away from this principle. The passage of 28
U.S.C. § 2111 did not change the analysis; instead, it simply
folded the Wilmington decision within it. If a circuit court were
to uphold a general verdict resting upon an invalid claim, the
Wilmington decision suggests that it would affect the substantial
rights of the parties per se. The Court's criminal rule is not to the
contrary. It is based on a predecessor statute to 28 U.S.C. § 2111
that was designed primarily to curb abuses in the criminal
appeals process. It not only does not apply, but it suggests that
28 U.S.C. § 2111 is aimed at the same type of abuse. Finally,
after the Court's decision in Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 9
a circuit court may not rely on a state harmless error rule to
escape the Baldwin line of cases, even in diversity cases,
because 28 U.S.C. § 2111 incorporates the Baldwin principle,
and the Supremacy Clause ensures that it trumps.
The life of the Baldwin principle has been highly
controversial. The Supreme Court may eventually have to revisit
it. Until it does so, I hope to have shown, as the clich6 goes, that
the reports of the Baldwin principle's death have been greatly
exaggerated.
195. 487 U.S. 22 (1988).

